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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of Debra Reifman Whitall for the Doctor of Philosophy
in Public Administration and Policy presented May 4, 2007.

Title: Network Analysis of a Shared Governance System

This study contributes to the growing body of literature on the role of networks in
creating efficacious systems of governance. In particular, this study considers if, in
addition to network structure, two network characteristics, network social capital and
network management, each have direct and indirect effects on network performance.
Also considered are the combined effects of these three network characteristics on
network performance. The findings of this study re-examine the relationship between
network characteristics and performance, especially the influence of network structure
on performance. Thus, this study has practical implications for policy makers
regarding effective collaborative strategies.
This study used an integrated model of network performance that drew upon social
capital and alternative dispute resolution theories, as well as social network analysis to
identify key components of network characteristics related to the population of 55
Forest Service Resource Advisory Committees (RACs), as authorized under the
Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000. In addition to
correlational analyses, multiple linear regression analyses were used to test the direct
and indirect effects of the predictor variables, network structure, network social capital
and network management, on the outcome variable network performance.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of network has become central to research in inter-organizational
relationships and public management (O’Toole & Meier, 1999; Provan & Milward,
1995; Choi, 2005). O’Toole (1997) states that, “...complex networks are not only
relatively common; they are also likely to increase in number and importance” (p. 46).
Choi (2005) argues “.. .the importance of networks is inescapable, not only because
intergovernmental programs make up a sizable proportion of total government
activities, but also because collective interactions have considerably increased by the
expansion of quasi-governmental arrangements” (2005, p.l). Finally, the
establishment of networks has become a response to increasing demand for
cooperation; particularly as the complexity and contentiousness of natural resource
management issues increases (Margerum & Whitall, 2004).
To measure the performance of networks, social network analysis has emerged as a
key technique in sociology and organizational studies. Research in these academic
fields have demonstrated that social networks operate on many levels, from the size of
families up to the level of nations, and play a critical role in determining the way
problems are solved, organizations are run, and the degree to which individuals
succeed in achieving their goals (Wikipedia contributors, 2006).
The social relationships between individuals, in terms of nodes and ties, are
instrumental to social network theory. Nodes are the individual actors within the
networks, and ties are the relationships between the actors. There can be many kinds
of ties between the nodes. In its most simple form, a social network is a map of all of
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the relevant ties between the nodes being studied. These relevant ties, or
relationships, can influence an individual’s behavior through the discovery of new
information and resources. Thus, the relationships forged within a social network help
determine a network's usefulness to its individuals. Recent studies have assumed a
direct relationship between a network’s structure and the outcomes generated by the
network (Provan & Milward, 1995; Ahuja & Carley, 1999). Lacking from these
studies is consideration of other network characteristics, such as network social capital
or network management. Network structure, while dominant in social network theory,
is only one explanatory variable of network performance (Provan & Milward, 1995;
Ahuja & Carley, 1999). By considering two other network characteristics in addition
to network structure, this study proposes to address this gap in current social network
theory.
Purpose o f Study
This study builds on the recent work of social capital theorists who argue that,
social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups” (Putnam, 2000, p.
19). The purpose of this study will be to consider if, in addition to network structure,
two network characteristics, network social capital and network management, each
have an effect on network performance. Another purpose is to consider the combined
effects of these three network characteristics on network performance. This research
addresses the following questions:
•

Do the network characteristics of social capital, network management, and
network structure influence network performance?
2

•

What relationships exist between these three network characteristics and
network performance?

•

What influence do these network characteristics have on network
performance?
Conceptual Framework

It has been argued that Federal natural resource agencies “cannot guarantee the
stability of communities or insulate them from the larger social and economic forces
that may affect their future” (MacCleery & Le Master, 1999, p.538). However, in the
waning days of the 106th Congress President Clinton attempted to provide this stability
by signing into law the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act
of 2000 (P.L. 106-393, hereby referred to as “the Act”). The intent was to stabilize
federal payments to qualifying counties during a six-year period (2000-2006) to
encourage diversification of local economies.
Another primary purpose of the Act was to improve cooperative relationships.
Central to achieving this goal was the establishment of Resource Advisory
Committees (RACs) under Title II of the Act. Analytically, RACs can be considered a
type of network, or set of connections between people, created for the purposes set out
in this law.
Recent studies (Ingles, 2004; Kusel, 2006; Forest Counties Payments
Committee; 2003; Wilson, 2003) suggest that the Act is effectively meeting its stated
purposes, including improvement of cooperative relationships. Ingles (2004) used
trends in fiscal data, including the amount of leveraged funds and the percentage of
3

increased funding to Title II projects, to conclude that some level of relationshipbuilding was being achieved.
Yet, as acknowledged in the previous section, these and other studies have assumed
a direct relationship between network characteristics and performance, and have
focused on the influence of network structure on performance (Ingles, 2004; Kusel,
2006; Forest Counties Payments Committee, 2003; Wilson, 2003; Provan & Milward,
1995; Ahuja & Carley, 1999). These studies did not consider whether other network
characteristics, such as network social capital or network management, might also
contribute to network performance. A recent study by Choi (2005) did investigate the
relationship of four network characteristics on network performance in the state of
Florida. Choi (2005) stated, “The principle guideline of this study was that network
structure is one important explanatory variable to explain network performance, but
consideration of other network characteristics is also valid and useful” (p. 131).
This study seeks to expand current social network theory by incorporating two key
network characteristics: network social capital and network management, in addition
to network structure, into an analysis of network performance. In doing so, this study
shall consider the entire population of Forest Service RACs authorized under the Act.

LITERATURE REVIEW
As acknowledged by Choi (2005), “There is a paucity of literature, which combines
network structure factors with other network characteristics explaining network
performance” (p. 11).
While network structure is one explanatory variable of network performance
(Seibert, Kraimer & Liden, 2001; Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992), others have found
that social capital, network learning and network management attributes may also
influence network performance (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; O’Toole, 1997; O’Toole
& Meier, 1999; Ostrom, 1990; Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2006; Choi, 2005). Thus, as
argued by Choi, “ .. .the consideration of other network characteristics as well as the
combination of network structure with other factors cannot be ignored” (p. 11). In this
section, three additional network characteristics will be identified and defined through
relevant theories of network performance.
Definition o f Network
Through his research on Italian regional government, Robert Putnam (1993)
discovered that the most important explanatory force driving governmental
performance is the quality and level of “horizontal” civic engagement in regional
affairs by individuals and associations. Putnam’s key explanatory variable is social
capital, which itself is attained by networking.

Putnam states, “[S]ocial capital here

refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (1993, p. 167).
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Putnam’s reference here to the trust and shared norms, or values, as critical features of
social organization will serve as the functional components of social capital for the
purposes of this research.
Building on Putnam’s assertions, if a network inherently contains structural
characteristics, such as nodes and ties, it is the addition of social organization features
such as trust and shared norms that effectively improve the efficiency of that network.
Further, Cross and Parker (2004) argue that it is the alignment of organizational
context in support of social networks that improves network function, or performance.
They further argue that a necessary aspect of organizational context, which leads to
improved network performance, is the identification of a group’s “natural unit of
work” (Cross & Parker, 2004, p. 119). For a RAC, this unit of work was identified
within the Act as reaching decisions on the selection of natural resource improvement
projects. Thus the following definition of a network is offered for the purposes of this
study: a network is an interdependent structure connected by some degree of trust and
shared norms, which is capable of reaching decisions towards the attainment of an
agreed- upon goal. This definition incorporates key characteristics of network
performance, which has found little integration in the literature.
Network Performance
Organizational performance has been characterized as a socially constructed
phenomenon that is subjective, complex, and particularly hard to measure in the public
sector (Herman & Renz, 1998; Kraft, Jauch & Boatwright, 1996; Anspach, 1991).
Adding to this complexity are the formal and informal dimensions of organizational
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performance. While focus is frequently placed on formal performance and
accountability measures, Wolf (1993) criticizes the inability of theories about
organizational effectiveness to explain the informal dynamics or interactions of
interorganizational relationships that lead to performance outcomes.
While public agencies have multiple constituencies demanding different
performance emphases, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) argued that public administration
scholars have focused on efficiency-related measures of performance at the expense of
outcome-based measures. Certainly, a fragmented and limited focus on performance
measures can lead to misleading conclusions about network efficacy. To overcome
these limitations, Choi (2005) argued that, “.. .network studies need to collectively ask
what is the network, and how is network performance measured?” (p. 4). Thus, to
help make sense of this confusing body of literature, social network research should
clearly delineate the organizational structure and specific outcomes of the networks
being studied. Therefore, this study will use operational definitions and measures of
network performance to avoid potential misconceptions.
For this study, a Resource Advisory Committee (RAC) network is defined
operationally as a 15-member network composed of three broadly defined interest
groups created to recommend projects as mandated by the Secure Rural Schools and
Community Self-Determination Act of 2000. Network performance is measured by
metrics identified in previous RAC studies including an efficiency measure; “project
dollars leveraged,” and an effectiveness measure “increase in Title II allocations over
the lifespan of the Act,” (Ingles, 2004; Kusel, 2006). Finally, to assess the level of
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relational development, the “commitment of RAC members to continue meeting the
goals and objectives set forth in the Act” will also be measured (Cross & Parker, 2004;
Birkhoff & Lowry, 2003).
Antecedents o f Network Performance
For the purposes of this study, antecedents of network performance have been
broadly grouped into three categories: network structure, network social capital, and
network management.
Network Structure
Network structure is focused on the positional characteristics of networks. Roch,
Scholz and McGraw (2000) contend that different network structures have varying
abilities to influence performance. To measure these characteristics, social network
researchers regard relationships, or ties, as the basic data for analysis. The focal
person in such an analysis is referred to as “ego,” and those they are tied to are
“alters” (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982).
The development of social network analysis evolved out of three main traditions of
theoretical involvement beginning in the 1930’s (Scott, 2000). These paths are
reflected by: the sociometric analysts, who focused on small groups and the
advancement of graph theory; several Harvard researchers who explored patterns of
interpersonal relations; and a group of Manchester anthropologists, who built on both
these paths to study the structure of community relations in tribal and village societies
(Scott, 2000). Scott (2000) further explains that these traditions were eventually
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brought together in the 1960s and 1970s, again at Harvard, when contemporary social
network analysis was created.
Key elements in the development of contemporary social network analysis during
the 1960s and 1970s included the use of algebraic models to examine kinship and the
development of scaling techniques for

. .translating relationships into social

distances and for mapping them in a social space” (Scott, 2000, p. 33). One of these
techniques focused on the idea of centrality of individuals and organizations in their
social networks. Freeman’s influential study (1979) describes centralization as the
overall cohesion or integration of individuals in a group. Implicit to the idea of
centralization is the notion of a structural center around which a point (i.e., node) or
set of points are organized. Thus, as suggested by Scott (2000), “The simplest and
most straight forward way to measure point centrality is by the degrees of the various
points in the graph” (p. 83). The degree is the number of other points to which a point
is directly adjacent to. A point is central, then, if it has a high degree; the individual in
this sense is considered well connected (Freeman, 1979; Scott, 2000). Thus, a degreebased measure of point centrality corresponds to the intuitive notion of how well
connected an individual is within their group.
Burt’s (1992) “structural holes” approach focuses attention on another
dimension of social network literature. A structural hole is said to exist between two
alters who are not connected to each other. Burt (1992) argues that structural holes
are likely to be found between alters who are members of different social groups, such
as those defined by functional and hierarchical boundaries within organizations (e.g.,
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departments), and that ego, by virtue of ego’s social connections, functions as a bridge
between two unconnected social groups. Thus, ego, by providing greater access to
social resources for all network members, amplifies the benefits of belonging to a
social network. According to structural holes theory (Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden,
2001), “

it is advantageous for ego to be connected to many alters who are

themselves unconnected to the other alters in ego’s network” (p. 221). According to
Burt’s theory (1992, 1997), networks rich in structural holes provide an individual
with three primary benefits: “more unique and timely access to information, greater
bargaining power and thus control over resources and outcomes, and greater visibility
and.. .opportunities throughout the social system” (Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001, p.
221 ).

Thus, in the social network literature, degree centrality focuses on the number of
ties, while structural holes theory focuses on the pattern of ties among alters. Both
degree centrality and structural holes present an opportunity for considering the
pattern of relationships among RAC participants. The literature demonstrates how
these patterns can influence the exchange of information and resources, which is
potentially related to the enhancement of RAC performance.
Network Social Capital
In contrast to the focus on patterns in network structure, network social capital
focuses on the interactions of network members. These interactions create value and
facilitate the productivity of network participants (Putnam, 1993; Ring & Van de Ven,
1994; Plummer & FitzGibbon, 2006). Ostrom (1992) initially identified concepts

10

such as common understanding, trust, and reciprocity as attributes of social capital.
Social trust, as defined by Ring and Van de Ven (1994),

. .emphasizes faith in the

moral integrity or good-will of others, which is produced through interpersonal
interactions that lead to social-psychological bonds of mutual norms, sentiments, and
friendships in dealing with uncertainty” (p. 93). Social trust and shared values,
enabled in this manner, gives organizations the necessary confidence that others will
act reliably and competently. Studies that demonstrate relationships with a high
degree of trust have found people more willing to engage in social exchange and
cooperative interaction (Putnam, 1993; Ostrom, 1992; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994;
Butler, 1991). Previous studies of RACS indicated that initial levels of trust varied
widely among RACs, and suggested that increasing levels of trust would improve
access to information and resources, enabling increased levels of performance (Ingles,
2004; Kusel, 2006; Forest Counties Payments Committee; 2003; Wilson, 2003).
Thus, trust and shared values constitute two important variables in the examination of
network performance.
Network Management
Work management practices constitute a key organizational element in the shaping
of network patterns and performance outcomes (Cross & Parker, 2004). Cross and
Parker (2004) argue that one of the most powerful attributes of work management
practices for developing effective networks is the group’s “natural unit of work”
(p. 119). In working together on an agreed-upon task, people are able to develop an
awareness of group members’ expertise and create social ties that increase the
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likelihood of receiving timely assistance (Selznick, 1957; Mintzberg, 1993; Doppelt,
2003; and Cross & Parker, 2004). Thus, from this theoretical lens, network
management that is temporally and spatially flexible within a given unit of work is
viewed as a condition for network success (McGuire, 2002; O’Toole & Meier, 1999;
Ostrom, 1990). For instance, the Act enables RACs to meet on a flexible schedule, in
a location of their choice, and as often as needed to reach agreement.
For RACs, the Act clearly identified the unit of work as reaching agreement on the
recommendation of specific projects (i.e., allocation of Title II funds) to the
Designated Federal Official for final approval. While the Act defined a specific
voting structure for reaching these decisions, Brogden (2003) acknowledges, “Many
steps occur on the way to decision-making...” (p. 278).
The theory and practice of dispute resolution offers insight into understanding and
assessing steps in the agreement-seeking process. For example, the ability of RACs to
reach decisions on the allocation of funds could be characterized as the resolution of a
distributional dispute (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). In this case, the dispute over
the allocation of funds involves the tangible benefits and costs of implementing
recommended projects.
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) argue, “In most distributional disputes, the
contending forces begin by concentrating all their energies on winning...” (p. 19).
Winning involves such transaction costs as building coalitions, lobbying for support,
altering public opinion, or garnering executive action (Brunner, et.al., 2002; Gibson,
McKean & Ostrom, 2000; Cortner & Moote, 1999; Carpenter & Kennedy, 1988;
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Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). These types of operational costs can be described as,
. .the classic techniques of political bargaining” (Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987, p.
19). Yet Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) argue that, while, “There is nothing
intrinsically wrong with such wheeling and dealing.. .it often produces minimally
acceptable results, or no results at all” (p. 19). In essence, when competing groups are
focused on winning, the result is often deadlock or stagnation.
The domain of dispute resolution also offers the concept of “all-gain agreements”
as an alternative to “win-lose” disputes (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987, p.33). Here,
participants must recognize that stability depends upon relationships (Margerum &
Whitall, 2004; Brunner, et.al., 2002; Gibson, McKean & Ostrom, 2000; Susskind &
Cruikshank, 1987). If disputing parties build strong working relationships they are
more likely to renegotiate and reach an agreement. To build strong working
relationships several crucial components are required, including: the exchange of
accurate information based on true priorities, the inclusion of diverse stakeholders, and
an ability to satisfy individual needs while meeting the needs of others (Brunner, et al.,
2002; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; Gibson, McKean & Ostrom, 2000; Doppelt, 2003;
Cross & Parker, 2004; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987).
Thus, while Ingles (2004) acknowledged that RACs vary in their decision making
processes relative to conducting business, their use of components associated with
building strong working relationships will provide insight into their ability to reach
agreement on the allocation of Title II funds.
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Integrating Network Characteristics

Each network characteristic presented above contains its own strengths and
weaknesses regarding network performance. While individually they appear
beneficial, the literature suggests that independently they cannot account for a
network’s overall performance. Therefore, this study will use a model composed of
two intermediating dimensions between network structure and network performance,
including network social capital and network management (Figure 1). These
intermediating dimensions will be key variables in analyzing the network performance
of RACs. It is expected that by accounting for network social capital and network
management in an analysis of performance, insights may be gained regarding key
factors in effective performance.

14

A N INTEGRATED MODEL OF NETWORK PERFORMANCE
Introduction
This study uses an integrated model of network performance that draws on social
network theory as described in the previous section to identify the key components of
network characteristics. This model argues that network performance is determined
by three network characteristics: network structure, network social capital, and
network management. While this study does not deny that each network characteristic
may affect network performance directly, of primary concern are the mediating effects
of network characteristics on network performance. Key here is the focus on the
interdependence of network characteristics on network performance. This section
explains network performance based on how each network characteristic is related to
the others in the model. Figure 1 represents an overview of the integrated model of
network performance.
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Integrated Model o f Network (RAC) Performance
Decision
Capability
Network
Management

Degree
Centrality
Network
Structure
Structural
Holes

Leveraged
Network
Performance

Network Social
Capital ^

Title II
Allocation

.Commitment

Legend
' Network
.characteristic;

Trust and
Shared Values

Inputs to
characteristics

Figure 1. Integrated Model of Network Performance
Figure 1 shows, for example, that network structure can influence network
performance directly, as well as indirectly, via the mediating variables network
management and network social capital. Thus, as argued by Choi,

. .network

structure may have direct and indirect influences on network performance. Likewise,
network social capital.. .and network management are affected by network structure
and each of them affects network performance. Moreover network management is
also affected by network social capital...” (2005, p. 35).
The following sections will present hypotheses for examining both direct and
indirect relationships of network characteristics and network performance.
Network Structure and Network Performance
The work of Freeman (1979) and Scott (2000) brought to bear the idea of centrality
of individuals and organizations in their social networks. By measuring the degree, or
16

number of other points to which a point (i.e., node) is directly adjacent, the level of
connectivity of an individual within a group can be understood. Thus, a degree-based
measure of point centrality corresponds to the intuitive notion of how well connected
an individual is within their group.
Granovetter (1973) argued that ties, which reach outside of one’s social clique, are
likely to be weak, and can serve as a bridge between densely interconnected social
cliques, and thus provide a source of unique information and resources. Also, Seibert,
Kraimer, and Liden (2001) stress that, “According to structural hole theory, an alter
who is already connected to other alters within ego’s network is redundant and does
not convey the types of benefits to ego that a non-redundant alter would” (p. 223).
Burt (1992) and Ibarra (1993) found that structural holes are likely to be found
between alters who are members of different social groups, and that ego, functioning
as a bridge between two unconnected social groups, benefits all the unconnected
individuals (alters) in both groups. Thus, due to ego’s connections, both groups’
alters benefit from greater access to the social resources of those groups.
Within a RAC, the 15 members equally represent the interests of three broad
categories: commodity production interests; national and local environmental and
recreation interests; and state, local and tribal interests (Appendix 1). This structure
brings together a wide array of interests, increasing the potential for creating new ties
among participants. Also, the likelihood for structural holes is present, providing an
opportunity for brokering information-flows across these three broad categories of
RAC members. This potential exists because each broker’s (i.e., ego’s) unique
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information advantage creates the possibility for enhanced RAC performance. Thus,
Hypotheses la and lb tests the following propositions:
Hypothesis la: Richer patterns o f ties, or structural holes, among RAC
members lead to increased performance outcomes.
Hypothesis lb: Greater numbers o f ties among RAC members lead to
increased performance outcomes.
Network Social Capital and Network Performance
As suggested by Putnam (1993) and O’Toole (1997) leveraging horizontal ties,
building on trust, and encouraging the development of cooperative norms can also
enhance governmental capacity. It is the premise of several studies (Ingles, 2004;
Kusel, 2006; Forest Counties Payments Committee, 2003; Wilson, 2003) that RACs
authorized under the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of
2000 have been successful in enhancing governmental capacity in natural resource
management. Kusel’s (2006) findings stated,
Perhaps most importantly, this study shows how successful the legislation has
been in developing collaborative relationships among RAC members, and
between RACs, and the counties and the federal agencies... [and].. .have
helped shape projects that are now improving forest and watershed health on
federal lands...(p. 1).
Importantly, the Act requires that all decisions must be approved by a majority of
each interest group (i.e., at least three votes from each group, for a minimum of nine).
It is proposed that this requirement fosters trust, as RAC members seek to exchange
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accurate information about their true priorities. Trust and shared values, as explicit
features of social capital, are important because they increase access to resources and
strengthen a network’s ability to adapt to unforeseen problems (Uzzi, 1996). To
recommend projects, RAC members are expected to share useful information and
resources with one another. That is, they are required to trust others for their own
benefit, which may play a significant role in enhancing RAC performance. To test
this, the following hypothesis is offered:
Hypothesis 2: RAC members with high levels o f trust and shared values lead to
better performance outcomes.
Network Management and Network Performance
The establishment of a unique process for reaching mutually-acceptable decisions
was mandated by the Act. Thus, the voting requirement serves as a control for the
potential to reach agreement for the entire population of RAC members. However, as
identified within alternative dispute resolution literature, a network’s ability to fulfill
its purposes and goals is also contingent on its ability to manage conflict, make
decisions, and adapt to the environment in which it operates. In this manner, network
participants can improve the chances of long-term success, or their decision capability,
by developing the capacity to reach a zone of agreement through network
management. This study will refer to the ability of RAC members to reach agreement
as decision capability.
Thus, this study will look for a direct relationship between the potential for
agreement and RAC performance.
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Hypothesis 3: RAC members with greater decision capability lead to more
effective or desirable performance outcomes.
Network Structure and Network Social Capital
According to Walker, Kogut, and Shan (1997) and Choi (2005), network structure
exists where social capital is distributed. Further, Choi (2005) insists,

. .network

structure plays an important role in the development of social constraints which direct
information flows in building and maintaining social capital” (p. 37). Thus, network
social capital may serve as a significant mediator between network structure and
network performance. As Choi explains, “.. .the effect of social capital is dependent
upon its position in the network structure” (2005, p. 37). Consequently, these two
network characteristics are interdependent for enhanced RAC performance.
Hypothesis 4: Among RA C members, network social capital is directly
affected by network structure, and it mediates the effect o f network structure on
performance outcomes.
Network Social Capital and Network Management
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) stress that to reach “all-gain agreements” conflict
should not be suppressed (p.33). Dukes (1996) reinforces this notion when he argues
that the attention granted to neutrality and environmental conflict resolution methods
are in some ways misdirected. Fie states (1996),
Neutrality is not a goal or a value in and of itself. Rather it is a means to
another end: it is, in fact, trust, acceptance and ultimately, entry, which are the
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desired products of neutrality and integral to the dispute resolution process (p.
176).
Thus, networks with a higher degree of trust will require fewer resources to manage
existing relationships. This also means that RACs with greater degrees of trust have
more resources available to establish higher levels of performance. In this sense,
network social capital has a significant association with network management.
Hypothesis 5. Among RAC members, network social capital has a positive
association with network management.
Network Structure and Network Management
It has been argued that multiple and diverse relationships among network
participants are more likely to make networks stable and lead to increased network
capacity (Brunner, et al., 2002; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; Gibson, McKean &
Ostrom, 2000; Doppelt, 2003; Cross & Parker, 2004; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987).
Thus, it is proposed that the greater the diversity of relationships among RAC
members, the more likely they will develop capacity to reach agreement. To test this
proposition, this final hypothesis is offered:
Hypothesis 6. Among RAC members, network management is determined by
network structure, and it mediates the effect o f network structure on
performance outcomes.
Control Variables
Numerous network studies have found that certain demographic variables including
age, sex, ethnicity, physical location, tenure, and other variables influence
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interpersonal communication in organizations (Allen, 1977; Lincoln & Miller, 1979;
Rogers & Kincaid, 1981; Stork & Richards, 1992). Therefore, in an effort to compare
respondents and non-respondents in order to isolate potential effects on the proposed
hypotheses, gender, RACs in single and multi-county jurisdictions, and appointed
interest group will be incorporated into this study. Ethnicity was considered as a
potential control variable yet dismissed once it was determined that ethnic diversity is
extremely low in the study population (U.S. Forest Service, October 6, 2005).
Summary
In this section a series of hypotheses were developed regarding direct and indirect
effects of network characteristics (network structure, management and social capital)
on network performance. Below is a summary of the hypotheses (Figure 2).
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Integrated M odel o f Network (RAC) Performance

Network
Management
Network
Structure

H 1(A&B>

Network
Performance

Network Social
^
Capital

HI a: Richer patterns of ties, or structural holes, among RAC members lead to
increased performance outcomes.
Hlb: Greater number of ties among RAC members lead to increased performance
outcomes.
H2: RAC members with high levels of trust and shared values lead to better
performance outcomes.
H3: RAC members with greater decision capability lead to more effective or desirable
performance outcomes.
H4: Among RAC members, network social capital is directly affected by network
structure, and it mediates the effect of network structure on performance outcomes.
H5: Among RAC members, network social capital has a positive association with
network management.
H6: Among RAC members, network management is determined by network structure,
and it mediates the effect of network structure on performance outcomes.

Figure 2. Summary of Hypotheses
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METHOD

This section outlines the methods, instruments and procedures developed to test the
hypotheses in this study. To begin, a discussion of the unit of analysis and research
setting will be presented, followed by data-collection methods and statistical analysis
procedures. Survey validation and reliability will then be presented, followed by a
discussion of the variables and their measurement.
Unit o f Analysis
According to Trochim (2005), “The unit of analysis is the major entity that you are
analyzing in your study” (p. 1). For instance, any of the following could be a unit of
analysis in a study: individuals, groups, artifacts, geographical units, or social
interactions. This study analyzed the personal-network level (i.e., egocentric), focusing
on the links, or relationships, that a focal individual had with other individuals and also
how these other individuals were connected to one another. In other words, this
approach sampled individual units, enumerated the local networks around them, and
predicted individual outcomes (i.e., commitment, trust, shared values, decision
capability, structural holes and degree centrality). Financial indicators of performance
(i.e., dollars leveraged and changes in Title II funding), while applied individually,
represent a group score for the RAC in which they participate.
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Research Setting

Study Population
Resource Advisory Committees (RACs) are composed of citizens, usually from the
county or counties of which they are comprised, for the purpose of making
recommendations for projects to improve natural resource conditions on or adjacent to
Federal lands. Importantly, money was available through the Act to fund the
implementation of these projects, once approved by a Designated Federal Official.
The Secretary of Agriculture appoints RAC members for three-year terms, which
can be extended for a second term. Each RAC is composed of fifteen members that
represent various community interests. The Act groups these interests into three broad
categories, with each category represented by five RAC members. Category A is
comprised of traditional resource-based industry and mechanized recreational
interests. Category B is comprised of environmental and non-motorized recreational
interests as well as archeological and historical interests. Category C is comprised of
elected officials, school officials, and those representing tribal interests (Table 1). The
Act calls for “balanced representation” from all three categories, but does not require
that all interests be represented on the committee (Table 1). Finally, RAC members
must reside in the state or states where the RAC is located.
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Table 1. Community Interests R epresented by RACs1
Category A
1. Organized labor
2. Developed outdoor user recreation, off highway vehicle users, or
commercial recreation
3. Energy and mineral development interests
4. Commercial timber
5. Federal grazing permittee or other land use permittee___________________
Category B
1. Nationally recognized environmental organizations
2. Regionally or locally recognized environmental organizations
3. Dispersed recreation activities
4. Archaeological and historical interests
5. Nationally or regionally recognized wild horse and burro interest groups
Category C
1. State elected office holder or their designee
2. County elected office holder
3. Represent American Indian tribes within or adjacent to the area for which
the committee is organized
4. School officials or teachers
5. Affected public at large____________________________________________
All 55 active RACs in thirteen states were studied: this equates to 825 RAC
members2. RACs are closely split between single and multi-county jurisdictions (30
RACs are limited to a single county while 26 RACs involve one or more county).
According to Ingles (2004), “In most states, the boundaries of the RAC coincide with
county boundaries, however in Oregon and Washington, the RAC area is often defined
by boundaries of one or more National Forests” (p. 23). The Ozark-Ouachita RAC in
Arkansas and Oklahoma includes twenty-two different counties (Appendix 3).

1 Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination A ct o f 2000, § 205(d)
2 This includes all RACs that have received Title II funds. Additional RACs have been chartered across
the country but currently have no Title II funds available to them and no advisory committee members
and therefore are not included in this figure.
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Sample Size
This study deployed the written survey instrument to the entire population of 55
Forest Service RACs, which constitutes 825 RAC members in 13 states. Initially,
because the entire population was surveyed, and results were not conceptualized to
another population, power analysis was not necessary. The response rate, 37.1%
resulted in 303 members of the population being surveyed, which is the sample size
used for subsequent statistical tests.
Data Collection and Data Analysis Procedures
Sampling Method
This study used both a self-administered written survey as well as historical data
located in existing Forest Service and General Services Administration databases. The
method for collecting network data was a sociometric survey in which individuals were
asked to describe their relationships with other organizational members (Dean & Brass,
1985; Nelson, 1989; Rogers & Kincaid, 1981; Tichy, Tushman, & Fombrun, 1980). A
packet of 15 surveys, including a cover letter, was mailed to each of the 55 Forest
Service RAC coordinators prior to a regularly scheduled RAC meeting. RAC
coordinators were asked to read the cover letter to the group at the conclusion of the
meeting, and to then distribute the surveys to those members wishing to participate.
Written instructions were also provided on the survey. Once RAC members completed
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the surveys they were asked to place them directly into a postage-paid, addressed
envelope provided at the meeting, which was then mailed by the RAC coordinator.
This survey required the identification of the respondent by name. To maintain
confidentiality, upon receipt of the survey each name received an alphanumeric code.
The alphanumeric code was the same for each RAC: the letter A, B, or C designates the
respondent’s interest group (as appointed to by the Secretary of Agriculture), followed
by a number, one through five (e.g. A1-A5, B1-B5, and C1-C5). Preceding each
individual’s alphanumeric code is a randomly assigned RAC number between one and
55, representing the total number of RACs (e.g., 55A3 or 46C5). This code was used
in all analysis and reporting. All surveys shall remain locked in a file cabinet at the
residence of the author for a period of three years following completion of this
research, after which they will be destroyed.
Data Analysis Procedures
Descriptive information is provided for all variables, including means, variances,
and standard deviations. In addition to correlational analyses, multiple linear
regression analysis was used to test the direct and indirect effects of the predictor
variables (network structure, network social capital and network management) on the
outcome (network performance). Figure 3 depicts the variables in the hypothesized
model and their relationships to each other.
The Baron and Kenny (1986) approach to testing mediational models establishes
whether the individual paths between the variables are significant. If they are, then
28

mediation can be further tested with Baron and Kenny’s (1986) fourth step. However,
it is preferable to test the significance of the indirect effect. Thus, the approach
employed in this study involves computing the partial regression coefficients and
calculating standard errors. Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2005) have developed freeware
(acquired at http://www.comm.ohiostate.edu/ahaves/SPSS%20programs/indirect.html. which provides the necessary
calculation of coefficients and standard errors. Because all RAC’s were surveyed, values
represent population parameters rather than sample statistics.

Integrated Model o f Network (RAC) Performance
Decision
Capability

Network
Management

Degree
Centrality
Network
Structure
Structural
Holes

Leveraged
Network
Performance

Network Social
...
Capital ^

Title II
Allocation

Commitment

Legend
Network
iharacteristici

Trust and
Shared Values

Variables o f
characteristics

Figure 3. Variables and Model of Network Performance
Survey Validation and Reliability
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In consideration o f accuracy, validity, and reliability for measurements, this study
used tested items from the literature. When necessary, tested items were adapted to fit
the situational characteristics of this study. As suggested by Trochim (2005), a
deductive scale development process was used to design the survey used in this study.
In this manner, derived items were designed to tap a previously defined theoretical
universe. The survey was pretested with a sample of respondents to provide feedback
on design layout, wording, or clarification of any ambiguous measurement items.
In this study, a seven-point Likert scale was used because, “.. .as the number of
rating scale categories decreases, so does the correlation coefficient, apart from any
inherent relationship between the variables being correlated” (Peterson, 2000, p. 65).
Trochim (2005) has suggested. “There are two basic concerns with respect to
reliability, consistency of items within a measure and stability of the measure over
time” (p. 18). Although reliability may be calculated in a number of ways, the most
commonly accepted measure, and the measure used in this study, was internal
consistency reliability using Cronbach's Alpha (Price & Mueller, 1986). Mahan
(2005) suggested that an alpha of .80 be the minimum acceptable standard for
demonstrating internal consistency. What follows is the description of individual
variables and measurement. The full questionnaire is included in Appendix 2.
Variables and Measurement
Network Structure: Degree Centrality and Structural Holes
To determine degree centrality and structural holes, RAC members were asked to
identify RAC members (alters) with whom they had exchanged information, advice, or
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other types of support regarding RAC project recommendations according to the
following scale:
2 = 1 exchange a great deal of information, advice or support with this person.
1 = 1 exchange some or little information, advice or support with this person.
0 = 1 exchange no information, advice or support with this person.
Degree centrality is the number of direct connections a person has. Two people (or
points) that are connected are considered adjacent to one another (Scott, 2000).
Adjacency expresses the fact that two people represented by points are directly related
or connected with one another. Scott (2000) further elucidates, “Those points to
which a particular point is adjacent are termed its neighborhood, and the total number
of other points in its neighborhood is termed its degree. Thus, the degree of a point is
a numerical measure of the size of its neighborhood” (p. 67).
While several measures of structural holes exist, this study used the measure
effective size, as developed by Burt (1992). To calculate effective size, redundancies
for each of ego’s alters are summed then subtracted from the total number of alters in
the network. For a typical RAC with 15 members, the number of alters is 14 for any
given individual. Thus, if none of ego’s alters were connected with any of the others,
the effective size would be 14.
Network Social Capital: Trust and Shared Values.
Butler (1991) undertook an in-depth study to develop a content theory of trust
conditions and to then derive valid scales for measuring them. These conditions of
trust include: “availability; competence; discreetness; fairness; integrity; loyalty;
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openness; promise fulfillment; and receptivity” (Butler, 1991, p. 653). In Butler’s
study, Cronbach’s alpha for these conditions ranged from a low of .84 for openness to
a high of .92 for receptivity. Based on these conditions of trust, and by adapting
survey questions for trust from Leach & Sabatier’s study (2003) of interpersonal trust
(Cronbach’s alpha was .83) and Choi’s research (2005) incorporating trust and shared
values (Cronbach’s alpha was .86), the following questions were asked of RAC
members (using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree to strongly
agree”):
•

This RAC is achieving the goals set forth in P.L. 106-393.

•

In addition to the goals required by P.L. 106-393, this RAC is achieving its
own goals.

•

When RAC members agree to something, I know they will keep to that
agreement.

•

Other RAC members reciprocate acts of good will or generosity.

•

Other RAC members listen and sincerely try to understand other points of
view.

•

Other RAC members propose solutions that are compatible with the needs of
most RAC members.

•

This RAC works hard to solve disagreements.

•

I am able to freely express new ideas, opinions or recommendations during all
meetings.

•

I easily accept changes to RAC rules and procedures.
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•

In my everyday life I always trust people, even those I don’t know.

•

I trust RAC members of the commodity production/motorized recreation
group.

•

I trust RAC members of the environmental/non-motorized recreation group.

•

I trust RAC members of the state, local and tribal representative group.

•

I understand what is expected of RAC members.

•

I carefully follow guidelines or rules created by the RAC.

•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on road, trail and infrastructure
maintenance.

•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on road, trail, and infrastructure
obliteration.

•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on soil productivity
improvement.

•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on improvements to forest
ecosystem health.

•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on watershed restoration and
maintenance.

•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on restoration, maintenance and
improvement of wildlife habitat.

•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on restoration, maintenance and
improvement of fish habitat.
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•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on control of noxious and
exotic weeds.

•

I believe RAC recommendations should focus on re-establishment of native
species.

One final question related to shared value asked respondents to rank the level of
importance from one (highest importance) to nine (lowest importance) the categories
of project objectives as listed in the Act.
Network Management: Decision Capability
As stated earlier, network management involves developing a network’s potential
for reaching agreement. It must be clarified that in this context “reaching agreement”
is not synonymous with reaching consensus, but rather on building good working
relationships. To build good working relationships several components have been
recognized as critical, including: the exchange of accurate information based on true
priorities, the inclusion of diverse stakeholders, and an ability to satisfy individual
needs while meeting the needs of others (Brunner, et al., 2002; Wondolleck & Yaffee,
2000; Gibson, McKean & Ostrom, 2000; Doppelt, 2003; Cross & Parker, 2004;
Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). Likewise, collaboration, as a process driven by
multiple stakeholders, usually involves the use of several components for reaching
agreement: (1) agreeing on a common purpose; (2) ensuring the process is both
inclusive and transparent; (3) allowing participants to design the process; (4)
promoting joint fact finding and creative problem solving; (5) insisting on
accountability; (6) developing an action plan; and (7) developing collaborative
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leadership (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; McKinney, 2001; Pess et al., 2003).
Therefore, the processes examined in this study are a type of collaborative network
management.
Building on these concepts, I have adapted questions from Brogden’s (2003)
“Assessment of Environmental Outcomes” and Choi’s (2005) research on network
characteristics (Cronbach’s alpha was .69). Using a case study, Brogden’s research
centered on the development of a proactive tool to assess multi-stakeholder
partnership approaches to conservation. The tool was developed during the November
2000 to July 2001 International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies sponsored
national policy dialogue on State Conservation Agreements. Over the course of the
national dialog, “More than 225 individuals participated in at least one of the eight
workshops” (2003, p. 283). From these workshops Brogden (2003) developed a
prospective evaluation checklist to assess environmental outcomes. Several questions
for use in this study’s survey were adapted from Brogden’s checklist. Finally, one
question from Ingles’ (2004) survey (no reliability measure was reported), was added
considering the importance of reaching agreement relative to the requirement that
project approval requires a majority vote in each 5-member subgroup. The following
questions were asked of RAC members (using the same seven-point Likert scale):
•

The mandate that project approval requires a majority in each 5-member
subgroup has been helpful to this RAC’s decision-making processes.

•

All interest groups with a stake in a specific project have been represented in
RAC discussions prior to decisions being made regarding that project.
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•

As a result of discussion or recommendation from others, my RAC readily
adapts to new rules and processes.

•

If there was a subcommittee, discussions and conclusions of that subcommittee
were disclosed to the full RAC during regular meetings.

•

When making decisions, this RAC identifies options that address the concerns
of all members.

•

This RAC evaluates options using specific criteria and /or procedures.

•

Once decisions are made, an action plan is developed to determine tasks and a
timeline.

•

A process for resolving disputes was agreed to early, and followed during all
proceedings.

•

This RAC addresses problems or issues openly and effectively.

•

If written agreements are made, they list who will accomplish what actions,
and a specific date for their completion.

Network Performance. Network performance was defined using the following
variables: dollars leveraged outside of Title II and appropriated Forest Service funds
for approved projects; change in Title II allocation over the lifespan of the legislation;
and level of RAC commitment (Refer to Appendix A for a description of Title II).
Ingles (2004) found that, “The ability to leverage funds suggests that multiple
groups have a stake in or deem a net benefit from a project” (p. 36). He also found
that increases to Title II funding have occurred over the life of the legislation.
Specifically he noted, “The trend has been towards the placement of more funds into
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Title II and less into Title III, suggesting that the relationship building activities that
are occurring between the groups involved in the RACs have been positive” (2004, p.
37). Both of these measures, leveraged funding and increased Title II funding, were
accessed through the existing U.S. Forest Service national RAC project database.
Finally, RAC commitment was measured by several attributes, including distance
traveled to meetings, willingness to serve additional terms of appointment, frequency
of meeting attendance, and desire for re-authorization of the Act. Roch, Scholz and
McGraw (2000) suggest that travel distance reflects the personal investment an
individual is willing to make in their participation on a network. Thus, greater travel
distances are one component of an increased level of commitment. To ascertain this,
RAC members were asked approximately how far they traveled to participate in
regularly scheduled RAC meetings (including any required subcommittee meetings).
Also to be included will be Ingles’ (2004) item related to RAC satisfaction:
•

“I feel that P.L. 106-393 should be renewed after fiscal year 2006” (p. 61).

Control Variables
To isolate potential effects on the proposed hypotheses, gender, RACs in single and
multi-county jurisdictions, and appointed interest group were assessed. Information
was attained through existing Forest Service and General Services Administration
(GSA) Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) databases. Forest Service data is
updated continuously by RAC Coordinators while GSA data is updated annually by
the agency FACA Coordinator.
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RESULTS
This chapter describes the data collection process and presents the results of the
research hypotheses tests. The validity and reliability of measurement models are
examined and descriptive statistics are presented. Finally, diagnostic analyses and the
results of regression and mediational analyses are presented.
Data Collection
The study sample is composed of the entire population of 55 Forest Service RACs,
which potentially constitute 825 RAC members in 13 states (Appendix C). At the time
of this study, eight positions were unfilled leaving a total of 817 RAC members.
Information about individual RAC members as well as group information was located
in two separate government-sponsored websites: the Forest Service Payments to States
RAC database and the GSA Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) database
(http://wwwnotes.fs.fed.us:81/r4/pavments_to_ states.nsf,
http://www.fido.gov/facadatabase/public.asp'). Information included each member’s
name, group affiliation, and gender. Group information included whether the RAC
served one or multiple counties, meeting minutes, and locations and dates for future
meetings. Because each database was updated by different people at varying times
during the year, both were used to obtain information on RAC members by crossreferencing each member’s name and group affiliation. When members could not be
cross-referenced, the local Forest Service RAC Coordinator was contacted to verify
RAC members’ names and group affiliations. In this manner, data was compiled for
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RAC member names, group affiliation, gender, and whether the RAC served single or
multiple counties.
In order to assess content validity, researchers at Portland State University and
experts in the U.S. Forest Service Research and Development branch examined
measurement scales for the model. Further, prior to administering the main survey, a
pilot survey was conducted on 10 participants representing a cross-section of RAC
members and Forest Service RAC Coordinators. Through these procedures, the
content validity of the measurement scales was verified prior to administering the final
instrument.
The pilot test resulted in minor re-wording of some items and confirmed that
respondents were able to answer the seven-point scaled questions without difficulty.
To improve understanding, one question was re-worded to rate project types using the
exact language of the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act
of 2000. The final survey instrument included 42 items: six related to level of
commitment; one to rating the level of information exchange among individual
members; 10 related to network management; 15 related to trust; and 10 rating the
level of shared values among members. The instrument is included as Appendix B
and approval for its use from the Portland State University Human Subjects Review
Board can be found in Appendix D.
Each RAC’s Forest Service Coordinator was asked to deliver and collect the self
administered survey questionnaire. Prior to mailing the survey package, an electronic
message was sent to each Forest Service RAC Coordinator explaining the purpose of
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the study, the voluntary nature of their participation, and the timeline for completion.
A packet of materials was then mailed to each Coordinator on July 7, 2006 including:
a letter of instruction to each Coordinator, 15 letters of explanation and Human
Subjects Informed Consent Disclosure; 15 questionnaires; a letter of introduction and
support from the President of the National Forest Counties and Schools Coalition, a
return postage paid envelope and 15 survey response privacy envelopes. After the
survey packets were mailed, electronic mail notices were sent to each Forest Service
RAC Coordinator.
Each Coordinator was asked to administer the survey after the committee had
completed all other business during a regularly scheduled meeting. They were further
instructed to read aloud the letter from the President of the National Forest Counties
and Schools Coalition and to then distribute the letter of explanation and Human
Subjects Informed Consent Disclosure to each member. While RAC members read
the letter of explanation and disclosure, the Coordinator distributed the individualized
surveys and privacy envelopes. After completing the questionnaire and placing it in
the privacy envelope, respondents then placed that envelope into the larger postage
paid return envelope. Finally, before sealing the postage paid envelope, RAC
Coordinators ensured surveys not completed were also enclosed before mailing the
packet back to the author.
Because RAC meeting dates varied, survey packets were returned over a fourmonth period, ending in early November 2006. A total of 303 surveys were returned
for an initial response rate of 37.1%. However, following diagnostics analyses, the
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final sample size contained a total of 302 respondents. Of the 55 RACs, 38 responded
to the survey, for a group response rate of 69.1%.
To conduct a network analysis, it was initially necessary to identify RAC members
by name. To protect the privacy of respondents, a coding system was developed.
Upon receipt of the surveys each name was replaced by an alphanumeric code.
Preceding each alphanumeric code a number between one and 55 was assigned,
representing that individual’s random RAC number. This code for each respondent
(e.g., 23C1) was used in all subsequent analysis and reporting.
To analyze the dependent performance variables “Dollars Leveraged” and “Title II
Allocation,” raw data was collected from the U.S. Forest Service Payments to States
RAC database (http://wwwnotes.fs.fed.us:81/r4/pavments to states.nsf). Specifically,
data was derived from the U.S. Forest Service All Service Receipts (ASR) 18-1
Reports for Fiscal Years 2001-2006 as well as data contained in the P.L. 106-393,
Title II Project Submission Forms located on the website. Data for these variables
were collected for all 55 RACs. The next section will describe how the raw data
derived from the survey instrument and the government-sponsored databases were
developed into measurements of the inputs to each of the characteristics in the
integrated model of network performance.
Measurement Models
Network Structure
Regarding network structure, the inputs degree centrality and structural holes were
derived from question number five on the survey instrument. This question asked
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respondents to rate the working relationship they had with other RAC members on
their committee. Data of this type is referred to as relational data as it focuses on the
ties and connections that relate one individual to another and so cannot be reduced to
the properties of the individuals themselves. The methods most appropriate to
relational data are those of network analysis, whereby relations are treated as linkages
that run between individuals. In short, network analysis consists of a body of
qualitative measures of network structure.
To record connections from the data collected, a square case-by-case matrix was
constructed in which each individual was listed twice, once in the row and once in the
column (Table 2). With the rows and columns representing cases, the individual cells
of the matrix show to what extent particular pairs of individuals are connected.
Table 2. Square Case-by-Case Matrix

12A1
12A2
12 A3
12B1
12B2
12B3
12C1
12C2
12C3

12A1
0
1
2
1
1
0
2
0
2

12A2
2
0
2
2
2
1
2
1
2

12 A3
2
1
0
2
2
1
2
1
1

12B1
1
0
0
0
2
1
1
2
1

12B2
2
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
1

12B3
1
1
0
2
1
0
1
1
1

12C1
2
1
2
1
0
1
0
0
1

12C2
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1

12C3
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0

In this type of square matrix it is important to note the line of diagonal cells
running from the top left to the bottom right. The cells in this diagonal are different
from all others in the matrix because they show the relation between any particular

case and itself (or an individual’s relationship to himself). For this study, these cells
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have no meaning, and are always “0,” as the concern of this study relates to the inter
personal relations of an individual. Therefore these cells are ignored in all analyses.
Missing Data
Knoke and Kuklinski (1982) write that there is “no failsafe solution to the missing
data problem” in network analysis (p. 35). For this study, an available case approach
using both fully described links (two descriptions) and links that are partially
described (one description) was employed. As described by Stork and Richards
(1992), “To use partially described links, the assumption is that if A describes a
relationship with B, that, indeed, a relationship does exist between them. This
assumption is operationalized by ascribing Person A ’s description of the A-B linkage
to B as well” (p. 197). They refer to this approach as “reconstruction,” and argue that
while it may seem analogous to imputation, where missing values are replaced by
estimated values, there is a difference (p. 197). They maintain, “Reconstruction in
network analysis does not add links to the data set where there were none. Rather
reconstruction simply allows the description supplied by one person to be how the link
between two people is described” (p. 197). Simply, one description rather than two
determines the presence or strength of a relationship.
In ascribing the respondents’ descriptions of relationships that they have with
nonrespondents to their nonresponding partners, a symmetrical data set resulted.
Because it is not known with whom the nonrespondents talk to, an assumption was
made that they talk to people who report talking to them. Thus, this study ascribes the
link descriptions supplied by the respondents to their nonresponding partners.
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To justify the use of reconstruction, Stork and Richard’s (1992) two recommended
criteria were employed:

. .the first is that respondents should not be systematically

different from nonrespondents.. .the second is that the data available from respondents
should be reliable descriptions of the relationships that they have with
nonrespondents” (p. 198).
Respondent and Nonrespondent Similarity
Variables such as sex, age, race, department, and level in the organization have
been shown to influence or constrain communication in organizations (Allen, 1977;
Lincoln & Miller, 1979; Rogers & Kincaid, 1981). Of the available data for this
study, the variables gender and group (i.e., Categories A, B, and C) are most aligned
with those variables just described to show influence or to constrain communication
among RAC members. Thus, these variables were tested for similarity between
respondents (n=303) and all RAC members (n=816).
To test whether group membership (i.e., Group A, B, or C) and gender were
associated with participation in the survey, contingency chi-square analyses were
conducted. The results of the analyses indicated that group membership (X2= .945, p
= .623) and gender (X2 = . 182, p = .670) were independent of whether or not they
responded. Therefore, the results suggest that there was no difference between
respondents and all RAC members with regard to either gender or group.
Thus, using individual data for the two variables gender and group, the first
criterion for using reconstruction was met, as no significant difference between
respondents to the survey instrument and all RAC members exists.
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Respondent Reliability
The second criterion for justifying reconstruction is that the data available from
respondents should be reliable descriptions of the relationships that they have with
nonrespondents. Reliability in this context is operationalized in network studies as
. .confirmation, or the extent of agreement between people on the nature of the
relationship (or relationships) between them” (Stork & Richards, 1992, p. 199). Stork
and Richards (1992) further elaborate,
Confirmation can be operationalized only for pairs of respondents, so the
confirmation rate in a network depends on the proportion of pairwise links
described similarly by both people involved. If non-respondents are similar to
respondents and the confirmation rate is high, the assumption is that a single
linkage description can reliably characterize the link between a respondent and
a nonrespondent (p. 199).
Stork and Richards (1992) describe the distinction between directed and undirected
communication as another important factor in considering confirmation. With
directed communication, the message is sent from one person to another, and was
defined in this study as the “exchange of information, advice or support.” Undirected
communication, on the other hand, has been described as two communication partners
effectively serving as

. .transceivers in the communication process” (Stork &

Richards, 1992, p. 199). Thus, undirected communication indicates a reciprocal
relationship whereas, in the case of directed communication, confirmation is not the
same as reciprocity, making the case for reconstruction more complicated. Yet, for the
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purposes of this study, the important consideration is the presence or absence of a
relation and not its direction. Therefore, the directionality of the data was ignored and
reduced to undirected data.
The confirmation of ties for this study was calculated by first removing all the
nonrespondents from the network analysis. Next, to further simplify the analysis the
valued data (i.e., 0, 1 or 2) were converted into binary data by using a cut-off value
for ‘slicing’ or dichotomizing the matrix. Data were dichotomized and tested at two
levels, greater than or equal to one and greater than or equal to two. In so doing,
values above a certain level are sliced off and used to construct a new matrix in which
values at or below this level are replaced by ‘0’ entries and values above it are
replaced by ‘ 1’ entries. Finally, the data were then symmetrized and run in the
network analysis program UCINet3 to determine the percent of reciprocated ties for
every RAC that responded to question five in the survey instrument.
The percent-reciprocated ties for 38 RACs, when dichotomized at greater than or
equal to one, ranged from a low of 36% to a high of 100% with an average of 69%.
When dichotomized at greater than or equal to two, the number of reciprocated ties for
the same 38 RACs ranged from a low of 0% to a high of 71% with an average of 33%.
The average of 33% for 38 RACs when dichotomized at greater than or equal to two
indicates a much lower confirmation of ties than when the same 38 RACs were
dichotomized at greater than or equal to one. Thus, while there is no standard for

3 UCINet is a social-network analysis tool capable o f performing most standard sociometric measures o f
network structure and dynamics including centrality and ego-networks (e.g., structural holes) Borgatti,
S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002. U cinet for W indows: Software for Social Network
Analysis. Harvard, MA: Analytic Technologies.

46

deciding when confirmation rates are “high enough,” or when nonrespondents and
respondents are “similar enough,” the 69% reciprocated ties when dichotomized at
greater than or equal to one confirmed a greater level of respondent reliability, and
was used in further analysis.
Thus, the two criteria recommended by Stork and Richards (1992), similarity of
respondents to nonrespondents, and respondent reliability, were met for using the
reconstruction method to minimize the impact of missing data within RAC networks.
Degree Centrality
Degree centrality in its simplest form is the number of direct connections a person
has. Two people (or points) that are connected are considered adjacent to one another
(Scott, 2000). Adjacency expresses the fact that two people represented by points are
directly related or connected with one another. As Scott (2000) explains, “Those
points to which a particular point is adjacent are termed its neighborhood, and the total
number of other points in its neighborhood is termed its degree. Thus, the degree of a
point is a numerical measure of the size of its neighborhood” (p. 67). The degree of a
point is illustrated in the square case-by-case matrix (Table 2) by the number of non
zero entries for that point in its row or column. UCINet was used to calculate the
degree centrality of each point and to also provide the overall network degree
centralization.
To assess the normality of this measure, Osborne (2002) suggests an examination
of skew and kurtosis. Skewness defines the disproportionate frequency of certain
scores; while kurtosis describes the quality of a distribution such that it is flat or
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peaked (Salkind, 2000). Herein, the distribution of this measure was assessed for
normality using SPSS. Skewness for the measure degree centrality was -.234 and the
kurtosis was -1.324. Curran, West, and Finch (1996) recommend skewness less than
or equal to two and kurtosis less than or equal to seven. Thus, these results are well
below the suggested maximum levels, indicating that the criteria for normalizing data
were met.
Structural Holes
A structural hole is an egocentric approach to measuring the density, or general
level of linkage among points - with a difference. In addition to the focal individual
and his or her direct contacts, structural holes evaluate the links that exist among these
contacts. While several measures of structural holes exist, this study used the
measure effective size, as developed by Burt (1992). To calculate effective size,
redundancies for each of ego’s alters are summed, then subtracted from the total
number of alters in the network. For a typical RAC with 15 members, the number of
alters is 14 for any given individual. Thus, if none of ego’s alters are connected with
any of the others, the effective size would be 14, which is the highest possible score.
Conversely, the higher the number of connections among ego’s alters, the lower the
effective size for that ego. UCINet was used to compute effective size for all points in
the network, treating each one in turn as ego.
The distribution of this measure was assessed for normality using SPSS. Skewness
for the measure effective size was 1.867 and the kurtosis was 3.740. These results are
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below the recommended maximums indicating the criteria for normalizing data were
met.
Network Social Capital
Measures of the characteristic network social capital included trust and shared
values. The variable trust was derived from 15 items in the survey instrument.
Respondents rated each item using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from a rating of
1 (strongly disagree) to a rating of 7 (strongly agree). A total trust score was
calculated for each individual by adding together the self-selected Likert scale values
for all 15 items.
The input shared values was derived from 11 items on the survey instrument. One
item, question 42, asked respondents to rank categories of projects on a scale from one
to nine (9 = lowest importance, 1 = highest importance). Because 25% of respondents
incorrectly filled out this question, it was separated from the other shared value items
and tested separately. For the remaining ten items an individual’s score was
calculated as the deviation from the RAC’s shared values, mean. To obtain this score,
the RAC mean for each item was first calculated by summing the self-selected Likert
scale values then dividing by the number of respondents for that RAC. The statistical
program SPSS was then used to calculate an individual’s deviation from the RAC
mean for each item. All items were then averaged for a total average shared values
score. This score represents the level of shared values among members of a given
RAC. Question 42 was computed separately using the same methodology for each of
the nine ranked items.
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Cronbach’s alpha is a common measure of internal reliability and is generally
considered to be acceptable if over .80 (Mahan, 2005). Internal consistency refers to
the degree to which the subparts of the instrument are all measuring the same input or
characteristic. The standardized Cronbach’s alpha of the 15-item trust scale was
computed to be .88 (#=291), which suggests high internal reliability. Yet, the item
total statistics (alpha if item deleted) indicated that if question 27 were removed, the
reliability would increase. Upon examination of this question it was determined that it
alone did not measure the level of trust within a RAC but instead focused on a
person’s general level of trust. Because of this difference this item was deleted and
the resulting standardized Cronbach’s alpha was computed to be .89 (#=291). The
standardized Cronbach’s alpha of the 10-item average shared values scale was
computed to be .70 (#=300) and .51 (#=233) for question 42 (9-item). Because of
this low reliability, question 42 was eliminated from further analysis.
The distributions of these measures were also assessed for normality using SPSS.
Skewness for the measures trust and average shared values was -.444 and -1.292
respectively. The kurtosis was -.289 for trust and 4.226 for average shared values.
These results are below the recommended maximums, indicating the criteria for
normalizing data were met.
Network Management
The characteristic network management was measured by a single variable,
decision capability. Decision capability was derived from 10 items in the survey
instrument. Respondents rated each item using the same seven-point Likert scale as
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before. A total decision capability score was calculated for each individual by adding
together the self-selected Likert scale values for all 10 items. The standardized
Cronbach’s alpha of the 10-item decision capability scale was computed to be .85
(iV=T34), which suggests high internal reliability. However, the item total statistics
(alpha if item deleted) indicated that if question 8 were removed the reliability would
increase. Upon examination of this question it was determined that it alone did not
measure the decision capability of a RAC but instead focused on the intent of the
legislation. Because of this difference this item was deleted and the resulting
standardized Cronbach’s alpha was computed to be .87 (iV=134).
The distribution of this measure was assessed for normality using SPSS. Skewness
for the measure decision capability was -.720 and the kurtosis was -.010. These
results are well below the recommended maximums, indicating the criteria for
normalizing data were met.
Network Performance
The characteristic network performance was measured by three separate dependent
variables: commitment, Title II allocation, and dollars leveraged. To assess an
individual’s overall level of commitment, an index was created from six items in the
survey instrument: percent meeting attendance, miles traveled to meetings, desire for
re-authorization, number of terms held, level of understanding of the Act, and desire to
serve additional terms. A range of possible points were assigned for each item (Table
3), then values for items three and four were multiplied together and summed with the
remaining items to create an individual’s overall commitment score.
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Table 3. Commitment Index
Item
Point Assignment—>
Number By Category

1
2

“Yes”
5
5

“No”
0
0

3

90-100%
20

80-89%
10

70-79%
6

60-69%
4

50-59%
2

<50%
1

16-50

51-100

101-150

151-200

201-200

>300

4

0-15
(Miles)
1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2

3

4

5

6

7

6

1
(Likert)
0

0

1

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

6

7

7

1
(Likert)
0

0

1

2

3

4

5

The distribution of this measure was assessed for normality using SPSS. Skewness
for the measure commitment was -.336 and the kurtosis was .470.

These results are

well below the recommended maximums indicating the criteria for normalizing data
were met.
The dependent variable “Title II allocation” was derived from the U.S. Forest
Service All Service Receipts (ASR) 18-1 Reports for Fiscal Years 2001-2006. These
annual reports list by state and county the “full payment base amount,” as authorized
by the Act. These reports also itemize the full base payment amount into dollars and
percentages allocated to Titles I, II, and III of the Act. For those RACs that serve a
single county, data were used directly from the ASR 18-1 reports. However, it is
important to note that some RACs do not follow county boundaries. The dollar values
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attributed to those RACs that served multiple counties included the sum of allocations
from each of the contributing counties. In the Pacific Northwest, for example, many
RACs cross county boundaries. In this situation the Payments to States Election Form
was referenced to determine the actual percentage of Title II funds allocated by a
county to a specific RAC.
Because of regional differences in allocations it was necessary to develop a
methodology for normalizing the data. Data were transformed to eliminate regional
differences by creating a measure of the average percent change from Title III to Title
II over the life of the legislation by RAC. Counties that received over $100,000 must
designate 15-20% of their full payment to some proportion of Titles II and III. Thus,
it is possible to measure the average percent change from Title III to Title II. The first
step in calculating this measure included adding together Titles II and III for each year
and then computing the percent of Title III. These percentages were then subtracted,
one year from the next to calculate the annual percent change. These annual percent
changes were then summed up, dividing by five to give the average percent change in
Title III. Because not all change from Title III to Title II is positive, values were
aligned to reflect negative changes. This means that where a negative change from
Title III to Title II occurred, more money went to Title III on average than to Title II.
The distribution of this measure was assessed for normality using SPSS. Skewness
for the measure average percent change from Title III to Title II was .182 and the
kurtosis was .050. These results are well below the recommended maximums,
indicating that the criteria for normalizing data were met.
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The final dependent value, dollars leveraged, was derived from the ASR 18-1
reports and data contained in the P.L. 106-393, Title II Project Submission Forms
(http://wwwnotes.fs.fed.us:81/r4/pavmentsto states.nsf). Again, data were
transformed to eliminate regional differences, in this case by creating a measure of the
average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II funds. The term “other” is a
category in the Title II Project Submission Form that relates to the amount of money a
RAC was able to acquire in addition to Title II funds and Forest Service contributed
funds (e.g., grants) (http://wwwnotes.fs.fed.us:81/r4/pavments to statcs.nsf). To
compute this measure, the percent of other dollars leveraged was calculated by
dividing other dollars leveraged by the same year’s Title II allocation. Annual
percentages were then summed and divided by the total number of years to give the
average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II funds.
Again, the distribution of this measure was assessed for normality using SPSS.
Skewness for the measure average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II was
.891 and the kurtosis was -.059. These results are below the recommended
maximums, indicating that the criteria for normalizing data were met.
Descriptive Statistics
The means, standard deviations, and variances for each of the network
characteristic input measures were calculated in SPSS and are reported in Table 4.
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Table 4. D escriptive Statistics
Input Measure

Sample
Size (AO

Mean

Standard
Deviation (s)

Variance
(s2)

Effective Size

566

2.46

2.16

4.66

Degree Centrality

566

8.35

4.51

20.33

Trust

291

85.72

8.08

65.29

Average Shared Value

300

6.02

.42

.18

Decision Capability

134

47.69

5.93

35.16

Commitment

300

37.48

8.98

80.59

Average percent change from
Title III to Title II

566

4.87

8.15

66.50

Average percent “other” funds
leveraged with Title II

566

41.78

33.68

1134.21

Effective size for this study (N= 566) occurred within a range of 0 to 14
enumerating the number of ties among ego’s alters with an average of 2.46 ties (s =
2.16, s2 = 4.66). Degree centrality (JV= 566) also has a range of 0 to 14, but in this
case, enumerates the number of direct connections a RAC member has with an
average of 8.35 ties (s = 4.51, s2 = 20.33). The overall trust score ranged from 7 to 98
possible points. The lowest trust score among respondents (N= 291) was 59 and the
highest trust score 98 with a mean score of 85.72 (s = 8.08, s2 = 65.29). Average
shared values ranged from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating a greater level of
shared values. Respondent’s average shared value scores ( N - 300) ranged from a low
of 4.10 to a high of 7.00 with a mean score of 6.02 (s = .42, s2 = .18). The decision
capability score ranged from 8 to 56 possible points. The lowest decision capability
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score among respondents (N = 134) was 29 and the highest decision capability score
56 with a mean of 47.69 (s = 5.93, s2 = 35.16). The commitment index ranged from 1
to 64 possible points. The lowest commitment score among respondents (N= 300)
was 11.40 and the highest 64 with an average score of 37.48 (s = 8.98, s2 = 80.59).
The average percent change from Title III to Title II (N= 566) ranged from -17.28
percent to 20.00 percent with an average percent change of 4.87 (s = 8.15, s = 66.50).
A negative percent indicates that more money went to Title III on average while a
positive percentage indicates that more money went to Title II. Finally, the average
percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II (N= 566) ranged from 0 - 1 1 9 percent
with an average of 41.78 percent leveraged (s = 33.68, s2 = 1134.21).
Diagnostic Analyses
Correlation Analysis
Table 5 summarizes correlation coefficients among the measurement variables to
check whether the data have possible collinearity issues among variables for
hypothesis testing. Trust and effective size are each positively correlated to both
commitment and degree centrality. Thus as expected, commitment and the number of
ties increased with an increasing level of trust and effective size. Also expected,
decision capability was positively correlated to commitment, degree centrality and
trust. The number of counties was positively correlated to commitment, meaning that
RACs representing two or more counties had increasing levels of commitment. Also a
control variable, group, was positively correlated to trust, decision capability, and
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gender. The greatest numbers of women were found in Group C, followed by Group
B.
The results in Table 5 indicate that trust and decision capability have a correlation
value higher than .80 (.803) (see discussion below). This is not surprising, given that
some degree of trust factors into a Committee’s decision capability. The remaining
correlation coefficients listed in Table 5 are not high, which suggests the variables are
very likely to be measuring different constructs.
Table 5. Correlation among Variables
Subscale

1

1 - Commitment

1.00

2 - Degree
Centrality
3 - Trust

.082

1.00

.353
**

.401
**

1.00

.238
**

.343
**

.803
**

.274
**

-.057

-.107 -.153

1.00

6 - Effective
Size
7 - Gender

.179
*

.422
**

.116

.083

.139

1.00

.150

.017

.121

.050

-.112

.083

1.00

8 - Group

.117

-.030

.228
**
-.058

.186
*

-.025

-.091

.192
*
.077

4 - Decision
Capability
5 - County

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.00

1.00

-.032 .063 .005
.168 1.00
9 - Mean
.031
-.026
SharedValues
Note. N = 134. * p < .05, two-tailed. ** p < .01, two-tailed. Pearson Correlation
coefficients are used.
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Outliers, Influential Cases, Multicollinearity, and Heteroscedasticity
Of the initial respondents, one outlier was deleted who was identified based on the
results of case-wise diagnostics (studentized deleted residual) and then confirmed for
deletion due to answering the survey questions incorrectly.
Prior to conducting regression analyses, additional diagnostic analyses were
undertaken to identify outliers, influential cases, multicollinearity, or
heteroscedasticity. The dependent variable commitment was regressed on the
following independent variables: degree centrality, effective size, trust, decision
capability, mean shared value, single or multiple counties, group, and gender.
Outliers on “y” were identified by computing studentized deleted residuals and
comparing the values to recommended scores (Neter, Wasseman, & Kutner, 1989).
Neter et al. (1989) recommend that values not exceed 3.0. By comparing computed
centered leverage values to the recommended cutoff of .2, outliers on “x” were
identified (Neter et al., 1989). By computing Cook’s Distance, Standard DFFit, and
DFBetas and comparing them to the suggested cutoff of 1.0, influential cases were
identified (Bollen & Jackman, 1990).
Two cases, 64 and 86, were identified as outliers (centered leverage value = .225
and .217, respectively). One case, 492, was identified as an influential case (Standard
DFFit = 1.069). The data input for these cases was checked and found to be correct.
The model was run with and without the outliers and the influential case, and because
there was no difference in the study results, the cases were retained.
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Multicollinearity statistics were computed in SPSS and are shown in Table 6.
Recommended cutoffs for collinearity include tolerance greater than .16 and a
variance inflation factor (VIF) less than 7 (Neter et al., 1989). Results indicate
multicollinearity was not an issue for this study.
Table 6. Collinearity Statistics, Dependent Variable is Commitment
Tolerance

VIF

.21

.68

1.47

1.49

.14

.78

1.29

.44

3.22

.00

.32

3.12

1.68

.02

.25

.80

.95

1.05

-.06

.18

-.05

-.35

.73

.93

1.08

Gender

2.34

1.57

.12

1.49

.14

.92

1.09

Group

.15

.78

.02

.19

.85

.87

1.15

5.34

1.41

.30

3.77

.00

.93

1.08

B

Std.
Error

t

Sig.

-7.50

12.79

-.59

.56

-.45

.36

-.12

-1.25

Effective Size

.57

.38

.13

Trust

.45

.14

Mean Shared Values

.42

Decision Capability

Model

(Constant)
Degree Centrality

Single/Multiple
Counties

Beta

The standardized residuals were plotted against the standardized predicted values to
display the distribution of errors. As shown in Figure 4 (next page), heteroscedasticity
is not a concern.
Evaluation o f Multi-level Structure
The data for this study is hierarchically structured, with individuals belonging
to groups, specifically RAC’s. In such samples, the individual observations may not
59

be completely independent of each other, which is a standard assumption of statistical
tests. If the assumption is violated, the estimates of standard errors are too small,
leading to spurious results (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Therefore, the effect of
grouping was considered prior to completing analysis by calculating the coefficient of
intra-class correlation (ICC). The ICC is the ratio of the between group variance to the
total variance. Intraclass correlation is large and positive when there is no variation
within the groups, but group means differ. Its maximum value is 1.0. The ICC for the
study data was computed using SPSS and was determined to be 13%, indicating little
of the variance is explained at the group level and the analysis can proceed at the
individual level.
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Testing the Hypotheses with M ultiple Linear Regression
Hypothesis l a

This hypothesis stated that richer patterns of ties, or structural holes, among RAC
members lead to increased performance outcomes. To test this hypothesis, regressions
for the independent variable effective size were run separately in SPSS for each of the
dependent performance variables: commitment (N = 300), average percent “other”
funds leveraged with Title II (N= 566), and average percent change from Title III to
Title II (N= 566). The regression analyses revealed that effective size significantly
predicts the performance measure commitment (B = .461, (3 = .119, p = .039), but did
not significantly predict either average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II (B
= .772, p = .050, p = .240), or average percent change from Title III to Title II (B =
.042, p = .011, p = 791). The R2 for effective size and commitment was .014,
accounting for 1.4% of the variance. Thus, while Hypothesis la was partially
supported, it accounted for a small percent of the variance. Positive effective size was
significantly associated with positive commitment.
Hypothesis lb
This hypothesis stated that greater numbers of ties among RAC members leads to
increased performance outcomes. Here, regressions for the independent variable
degree centrality were run separately with each of the dependent performance
variables: commitment (N= 300), average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title
II (N= 566), and average percent change from Title III to Title II (N = 566). These
regression analyses revealed that degree centrality significantly predicted both
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commitment (B = .680, [3 = .207, p - .000) and the average percent change from Title
III to Title II (B = -.187, |3 = -.104, p = .014). Degree centrality did not, however,
predict the average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II (B = .152, p = .020, p
= .628). The R2 for degree centrality and commitment was .043 and .011, respectively
for the average percent change from Title III to Title II. Therefore, Hypothesis lb was
also partially supported. Positive degree centrality was significantly associated with
positive commitment. However, positive degree centrality was significantly
associated with a negative average percent change from Title III to Title II. In other
words, a greater number of ties were significantly associated with a decreasing
percentage of Title II funds (this finding further explored in the Discussion section).
Hypothesis 2
This hypothesis stated that RAC members with high levels of trust and shared
values lead to better performance outcomes. Regressions for the independent
variables trust and mean shared value were run separately for each of the dependent
performance variables: commitment (N = 291 for trust, N = 298 for mean shared
value), average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II (N= 291 for trust, N 300 for “avg. other”), and average percent change from Title III to Title II (N= 291
for trust, N = 300 for “Title III to II”). Results of regression analyses are summarized
in Table 7.
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Table 7. Regression Statistics fo r Hypothesis 2
Independent
Variable
Trust

Mean Shared
Value

B

S.E.

Dependent
Variable
Avg. Other

.132

Title III to II

-.116

Commitment

.281

.062

Avg. Other 2.010

.236

□

t - value Significance

.033

.559

.577

.057 -.119

-2.04

.043

.256

4.51

.000

4.489

.026

.488

.655

Title III to II

-.195

1.101

-.010

-A ll

.860

Commitment

-.254

1.234 -.012

-.206

.837

Results of the regression analyses indicated that trust significantly predicted both
the average percent change from Title III to Title II (B = -.116, (3 = -.119, p = .043)
and commitment (B = .281, p = .256, p = .000), yet did not predict the average percent
“other” funds leveraged with Title II (B = .132, p = .033, p = .577). The R2 for trust
and Title III to II was .014 and .066 for trust and commitment. Mean shared value did
not predict any of the performance variables (B = 2.010, p = .026 p = .655 for avg.
other; B = -.195, P = -.010, p = .860 for Title III to II; and B = -.254, p —.012, p =
.837 for commitment). Thus Hypothesis 2 was partially supported: positive trust was
significantly associated with positive commitment. Again, positive trust was
significantly associated with a negative average percent change from Title III to Title
II. In other words, a greater level of trust was significantly associated with a
decreasing percentage of Title II funds (further explored in the Discussion section).
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Hypothesis 3

This hypothesis asserts that RAC members with greater decision capability have
more effective or desirable performance outcomes. Regressions for the independent
variable decision capability were run separately with each of the dependent
performance variables: commitment ( N - 134), average percent “other” funds
leveraged with Title II (N= 134), and average percent change from Title III to Title II
(N= 134). These regression analyses suggested that decision capability significantly
predicted commitment (B = .334, p = .238, p = .006), but did not predict either the
average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II (B = .051, P = .010, p = .912) or
the average percent change from Title III to Title II (B = -.123, p = -.086, p = .321).
The R2 for decision capability and commitment was .057. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was
partially supported where positive decision capability was significantly associated
with positive commitment.
Testing Mediation with Linear Regression
The Baron and Kenny (1986) approach to testing mediational models establishes
whether the individual paths between the variables are significant: if they are, then
mediation can be further tested with Baron and Kenny’s (1986) fourth step. However,
it is preferable to test the significance of the indirect effect. The approach involves
computing the partial regression coefficients and calculating standard errors. Preacher
and Hayes (2004, 2005) have developed freeware, accessed from
(http://www.comm.ohio-state.edu/ahaves/SPSS%20programs/indirect.htmf which
provides the necessary calculation of coefficients and standard errors.
64

The mediational model tested is shown in Figure 5. In this figure, c is the total
effect of X on Y, c' is the direct effect of X on Y, and the specific indirect effect of X on
Y through mediator M is defined as a\b\. The test was run in SPSS and allows for
multiple mediators, statistical control of covariates, and all possible pairwise
comparisons between indirect effects. The software produces bias-corrected and biascorrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals in addition to percentilebased bootstrap confidence intervals.

X

Y

JW
controls

controls

Figure 5. Multiple Mediator Model.
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Hypothesis 4

This hypothesis states that within a RAC, network social capital is directly affected
by network structure, and it mediates the effect of network structure on performance
outcomes.
Three paths for this hypothesis were tested for mediational effects: trust mediating
the effect of degree centrality on both commitment and the average percent change
from Title III to Title II, and trust mediating the effect of effective size on
commitment. Results of testing mediation with multiple linear regressions for each
path are reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10.
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Table 8. Trust M ediating Effect o f D egree Centrality on Commitment
Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
4.2664
Trust
.7320
.1716

P

.0000

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
d
3.8432
Trust
.2455
.0639
.0001

Total Effect o f IV on D V (c path)
Coeff
se
Degree
6242
.1907
Centrality

t
3.2727

.0012

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Degree
.4444
.1921
Centrality

t
2.3135

.0214

P

P

Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq
.0828

Adi R-sa
.0764

F
12.9955

dfl
2.0000

df2
288.0000

P

.0000

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
TOTAL .1797
.1792
-.0005
.0648
Trust
.1797
.1792
-.0005
.0648
Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
Lower
Upper
TOTAL .0712
.3252
Trust
.0712
.3252

Note. N = 2 9 \. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.

67

Table 9. Trust Mediating Effect o f D egree Centrality on Title III to II
Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff_________ se__________ t_____________ 2
4.2664
Trust
.7320
.1716
.0000

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
n
Trust
-.0939
.0586
.1103
-1.6019

Total Effect o f IV on D V (c path)
Coeff
se
Degree
-.3428
.1714
Centrality

t
-1.9998

p
.0465

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Degree
-.2741
.1763
Centrality

t
-1.5550

.1210

P

Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sa
.0224

Adi R-sa
F
.0156
3.2935

dfl
2.0000

df2
288.0000

P

.0385

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
TOTAL -.0687
-.0703
-.0016
.0517
Trust
-.0687
-.0703
-.0016
.0517
Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
Lower_______ Upper
TOTAL -.2032
.0101
Trust
-.2032
.0101

Note. N = 291. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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Table 10. Trust M ediating Effect o f Effective Size on Commitment

Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
Trust
.5470
.2094
2.6120

P

.0095

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
o
.0000
Trust
.2670
.0630
4.2373

Total Effect o f IV on D V (c path)
Coeff
se
Effective .4889
.2308
Size

t
2.1180

.0350

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Effective .3429
.2270
Size

t
1.5105

.1320

P

P

Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq
.0731

Adi R-sq
.0666

F
11.3521

dfl
2.0000

df2
288.0000

P

.0000

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
TOTAL .1461
.1451
-.0010
.0617
Trust
.1461
.1451
-.0010
.0617
Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
Lower
Upper
TOTAL .0401
.2886
Trust
.0401
.2886
Note. N = 291. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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Results of the mediational paths indicate that the effects of degree centrality and
effective size on commitment were mediated by trust (confidence intervals .0712 to
.3252 and .0401 to .2886, respectively). Trust partially mediated the effect of degree
centrality on commitment as the direct path c’ was still significant, whereas effective
size was fully mediated by trust as the direct path c’ was no longer significant. The
effect of degree centrality on the average percent change from Title III to Title II was
not mediated by trust (confidence interval -.2032 to .0101).
It was also important to test whether the mediational paths were influenced by the
control variables: gender, single or multiple counties, and group (i.e., Group A, B, or
C). To determine this, the three mediational paths were tested again, this time
incorporating the control variables. Results of testing mediation for each of the three
paths with the control variables are reported in Tables 11, 12, and 13.
The results of the mediational tests indicated that trust continued to mediate the
effect of degree centrality and effective size on commitment, controlling for gender,
number of counties, and group. Again, trust partially mediated the effect of degree
centrality on commitment and fully mediated the effect of effective size on
commitment. As expected, with the addition of covariates, R2 values increased
somewhat.
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Table 11. Trust M ediating Effect o f D egree Centrality on Commitment with Controls
Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
Trust
.7571
.1693
4.4708

P
.0000

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
p
Trust
.2699
.0635
4.2488
.0000
Total Effect o f IV on D V (c path)
Coeff
se
Degree
.6091
.1872
Centrality

t

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Degree
.4048
.1881
Centrality
Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq
Adi R-sq
F
.1377

.1226

9.1060

P
.0013

3.2532

t

P
.0323

2.1516

dfl
5.0000

df2
285.0000

Partial Effect o f Control Variables on D V
Coeff
se
t
3.9113
County
3.9148
1.0009
1.0444
Gender
1.2427
1.1899
Group
-.8993
.6005
-1.4977

P
.0000

P
.0001
.2972
.1353

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
.0702
TOTAL .2043
.2055
.0012
0702
Trust
.2043
.2055
.0012
Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
Lower
Upper
TOTAL .0860
.3661
Trust
.0860
.3661

Note. N = 291. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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Table 12. Trust M ediating Effect o f D egree Centrality on Title III to II with Controls
Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
Trust
.7571
.1693
4.4708

P
.0000

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
d
Trust
-.0776
.0595
-1.3036
.1934
Total Effect o f IV on DV (cpath)
Coeff
se
Degree
-.3584
.1706
Centrality

t

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Degree
-.2997
.1762
Centrality
Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq Adi R-sq
F
.0420

.0252

2.5002

P
.0365

-2.1011

t

P
.0901

-1.7006

dfl
5.0000

df2
285.0000

Partial Effect o f Control Variables on D V
Coeff
se
t
County
-.4718
.9376
-.5033
-2.3609
Gender
-2.6315
1.1146
.0967
Group
.0544
.5625

P
.0309

P
.6152
.0189
.9230

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
0570
TOTAL -.0587
-.0618
-.0031
.0570
Trust
-.0587
-.0618
-.0031
Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
TOTAL
Trust

Lower
- .1823

-.1 8 2 3

Upper

.0393
.0393

Note. N = 291. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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Table 13. Trust M ediating Effect o f Effective Size on Commitment with Controls
Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
Trust
.5999
.2112
2.8409

P
.0048

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
t>
4.7262
Trust
.2963
.0627
.0000
Total Effect o f IV on D V (c path)
Coeff
se
Effective .3629
.2321
Size

t
1.5637

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Effective .1852
.2270
Size
Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq Adi R-sq
F
.1258

.1104

.2012

t
.8156

dfl

df2

5.0000

285.0000

Partial Effect o f Control Variables on D V
Coeff
se
t
County
3.8608
1.0292
3.7511
Gender
1.1032
1.1961
.9223
-1.5858
Group
-.9596
.0651

P
.1190

p
.4154

P
.0000

p
.0002
.3572
.1139

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
TOTAL .1461
.1451
-.0010
.0617
Trust
.1461
.1451
-.0010
.0617
Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
TOTAL
Trust

Lower
.0401
.0401

Upper
.2886
.2886

Note. N = 291. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported where trust was positively associated with both
degree centrality and effective size. Also supported in this hypothesis were the
mediational effects of trust on commitment.
Hypothesis 6
This hypothesis states that within a RAC, network management is determined by
network structure, and it mediates the effect of network structure on performance
outcomes. Thus, this hypothesis tested whether decision capability mediates the effect
of degree centrality on commitment. In addition, trust and decision capability were
tested together in a mediational path. Results are reported in Tables 14 and 15.
Results indicate that the effect of degree centrality on commitment was fully
mediated by decision capability (confidence interval .0618 to .6050). This suggested
the effect of degree centrality on commitment occurred only through decision
capability. However, when the mediational analysis was run with both trust and
decision capability as mediators, the results indicated that when controlling for trust,
the mediational affect of decision capability is no longer significant.
Here again, it was important to test whether the mediational paths were influenced
by the control variables: gender, single or multiple counties, and group (i.e., Group A,
B, or C). To determine this, the mediational paths were tested again, this time
incorporating the control variables. Results of testing mediation for both paths with
the control variables are reported in Tables 16 and 17.
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Table 14. D ecision Capability M ediating Effect o f D egree Centrality on Commitment

Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
4.1899
Decision. .9508
.2269
Capability

P
.0001

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
n
2.6381
.0093
Decision .3337
.1265
Capability
Total Effect o fIV o n D V (c path)
Coeff
se
Degree
.3187
.3371
Centrality
Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Degree
.0015
.3510
Centrality
Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq Adi R-sq
F
.0568

.0424

3.9470

t

p

.9454

.3462

t

P
.9967

.0042

dfl

df2

2.0000

131.0000

P
.0217

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
.1369
TOTAL .3173
.3141
-.0031
.1369
Dec. Cap. .3173
.3141
-.0031
Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
Lower
Upper
TOTAL .0618
.6050
Dec. Cap. .0618

.6050

Note. N = 134. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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Table 15. Decision Capability and Trust Mediating Effect o f D egree Centrality on
Commitment

Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
Trust
1.5149
.3011
5.0318
Dec. Cap. .9508
.2269
4.1899

P
.0000
.0001

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
n
Trust
.4940
.1446
3.4159
.0008
Dec. Cap. -.1733
.1919
-.9032
.3681
Total Effect o f IV on D V (c path)
Coeff
se
Degree
.3187
.3371
Centrality

t
.9454

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Degree -.2649
.3464
Centrality
Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq Adi R-sa
F
.1345

.1145

6.7350

t
-.7647

dfl

d£2

3.0000

130.0000

P
.3462

P
.4458

P
.0003

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
TOTAL .5836
.5790
-.0046
.1686
Trust
.7484
.7596
.0112
.2661
Dec. C ap. -.1648
-.1806
-.0158
.2117
Bias Corrected and Accelerated Confidence Intervals
Lower
Upper
TOTAL

.3045

1.0291

Trust
.3386
1.3652
Dec. C ap. -.6763
.1759
Note. N = 134. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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Table 16. Decision Capability M ediating Effect o f D egree Centrality on Commitment
with Controls

Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
Dec. Cap. .9470
.2228
4.2507

P

.0000

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
d
.0024
Dec. Cap. .3794
.1227
3.0926
Total Effect o fIV o n D V (cp a th )
Coeff
se
Degree
.3861
.3206
Centrality

t
1.2044

.2306

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Degree
.0268
.3315
Centrality

t
.0809

.9357

Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq
Adi R-sq
F
.1869
.1552
5.8854

dfl
5.0000

d£2
128.0000

Partial Effect o f Control Variables on D V
Coeff
se
t
4.1353
County
5.9456
1.4377
2.0189
Gender
3.2365
1.6031
.5270
Group
.4150
.7874

P

P

P

.0001

p
.0001
.0456
.5991

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
.1414
-.0129
TOTAL .3593
.3464
.1414
-.0129
Dec. Cap. .3593
.3464
B ia s C o r re c te d a n d A c c e le r a te d C on fiden ce In te rva ls

Lower
TOTAL .1302
Dec. Cap. .1302

Upper
.7059
.7059

Note. N = 134. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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Table 17. Decision Capability and Trust M ediating Effect o f D egree Centrality on
Commitment with Controls
Independent Variable (IV) to Mediators (a paths)
Coeff
se
t
Trust
1.5214
.2927
5.1976
Dec. Cap. .9470
.2228
4.2507

P
.0000
.0000

Direct Effects o f Mediators on Dependent Variable (DV) (b paths)
Coeff
se
t
n
.0019
Trust
.4420
.1394
3.1715
Dec. Cap. -.0631
.1831
-.3445
.7310
Total Effect o f IV on D V (cpath)
Coeff
se
Degree
.3861
.3206
Centrality

t
1.2044

Direct Effect o f IV on D V (c'path)
Coeff
se
Degree
-.2266
.3302
Centrality
Fit Statistics fo r D V Model
R-sq
Adi R-sq
F
.2466

.2110

6.9279

t
-.6862

dfl
6.0000

df2
127.0000

Partial Effect o f Control Variables on D V
Coeff
se
t
4.1443
County
5.7632
1.3906
1.7080
Gender
2.6641
1.5597
.0980
Group
.0753
.7685

P
.2306

P
.4938

P
.0000

p
.0001
.0901
.9221

BOOTSTRAP RESULTS FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS
Indirect Effects o f IV on D V through Proposed Mediators (ab paths)
Data
Boot
Bias
SE
TOTAL
.6127
Trust
.6724
Dec. Cap. -.0597

.5863
.6660
-.0796

.0264
.0065
.0199

.1737
.2348
.1760

B ia s C o rr e c te d a n d A c c e le r a te d C on fiden ce In te rv a ls

Lower
TOTAL
.3189
Trust
.2873
Dec. Cap. -.4392

Urmer
1.0093
1.2224
.2659

Note. N = 134. Confidence Intervals = 95. Number of Bootstrap Re-samples = 1000.
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By adding the controls, the results of the mediational paths indicated that the effect
of degree centrality on commitment remained fully mediated by decision capability.
However, when the mediational analysis was run with both trust and decision
capability, the results confirmed that when accounting for trust, the mediational affect
of decision capability is no longer significant.
Hypothesis 5
This hypothesis asserts that within a RAC, network social capital has a positive
association with network management. Regressions for the independent variables
trust and mean shared value were each run separately for the dependent variable
decision capability (N = 134). These regression analyses indicated that trust
significantly predicted decision capability (B = .590, p = .803, p = .000) while mean
shared value did not predict decision capability (B = -.492, p = -.032, p = .711). The
R2 for trust and decision capability was .645. However as discussed previously, a
correlation of .803 exists between trust and decision capability indicating that the two
variables may be tapping the same construct. In addition, the mediational model,
which tested both trust and decision capability predicting performance, indicated that
decision capability was no longer significant when controlling for trust.
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DISCUSSION

Contributions
The main contribution of this study to social network literature is the re
examination of the assumed direct relationship between network characteristics and
performance, especially as it pertains to the influence of network structure on
performance. Three network characteristics: network structure, network social capital
and network management, were examined for their predictive capability of network
performance. Multiple linear regression analysis was used to test the direct and indirect
effects of the predictor variables (network structure, network social capital and network
management) on the outcome (network performance). Results of these analyses
indicate that, while a direct relationship does exist between network structure and
performance, the effects of network social capital and network management also
mediate it. Thus, while network structure is one important explanatory variable of
network performance, the variables network management and network social capital
are also valid and useful in explaining network performance.
This study also provides practical implications for policy makers in the use of
network structures for achieving effective natural resource management outcomes.
These implications include: the need to develop existing, and hire new government
employees with network skills more reflective of today’s demands; balancing
accountability measures with the decentralized, flexible, and creative nature o f

networks, and; building discursive democracy by understanding that sharing
information from non-traditional sources potentially transforms the knowledge base
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for decisions. In this manner, joint understanding is created, frequently reshaping
public understanding of the problem and alternatives for its resolution.
Study Findings
Introduction
Antecedents of network performance were broadly grouped into three categories:
network structure, network social capital, and network management. Together, these
antecedents of network performance constitute the definition of a network presented in
this study: an interdependent structure connected by some degree of trust and shared
norms, which is capable of reaching decisions towards attainment of an agreed-upon
goal. This definition highlights the integral nature of the studied network
characteristics as well as their unique contribution to network performance. Thus, the
findings presented in this section will discuss the direct effect of each network
characteristic on performance first, followed by a discussion of the mediational effects
of network social capital and network management on network structure.
Network Structure
The direct effect of this network characteristic on performance was tested in
Hypotheses la and lb. Results indicated that while Hypothesis la was partially
'j

supported, it accounted for a small percent of the variance (R = .014). Thus, while
positive effective size was significantly associated with positive commitment, the
overall contribution of effective size in predicting the performance outcome
commitment was minimal. Further Hypothesis la did not significantly predict either
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average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II (B = .772, P = .050, p = .240), or
average percent change from Title III to Title II (B = .042, P = .011, p = 791).
Hypothesis lb stated that greater numbers of ties among RAC members lead to
increased performance outcomes. Here, results revealed that degree centrality did
significantly predict both commitment (B = .680, p = .207, p = .000) and the average
percent change from Title III to Title II (B = -.187, P = -.104, p = .014). Degree
centrality did not, however, predict the average percent “other” funds leveraged with
Title II (B = .152, p = .020, p = .628). Again, results of Hypothesis lb accounted for a
small percent of the variance (R2“ .043 for commitment, and R2- .011 for the average
percent change from Title III to Title II), indicating that the overall contribution of
degree centrality in predicting performance outcomes was minimal.
Yet contrary to the positive relationship hypothesized between degree centrality
and the average percent change from Title III to Title II, positive degree centrality was
significantly associated with a negative average percent change from Title III to Title
II. These results indicate that a greater number of ties were significantly associated
with a decreasing percentage of Title II funds over the course of the legislation. A
potential reason for this result may be that as the number of ties among RAC members
increased, access to new information and resources may have led members to consider
other types of needed projects. For example, while Title II funds were appropriately
used for the implementation of ecosystem health projects, these projects could not be
implemented without the necessary planning documents in place. Title III funds
however, could appropriately be used to develop the needed planning documents
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through Community Wildfire Protection Planning processes. This situation does not
necessarily reflect a lack of performance, but rather an integrated approach to
achieving the goal of improving ecosystem health.
This possibility brings into question whether the measure average percent change
from Title III to Title II serves as a positive indicator of RAC performance. Previous
studies (Ingles, 2004; Kusel, 2006; Forest Counties Payments Committee, 2003) as
well as other traditional government accomplishment reporting mechanisms, have
focused on the expenditure or leveraging of financial resources as a primary outcome
of effective resource management. While accounting for the appropriate expenditure
of financial resources is necessary, it does not reflect whether there is actual
improvement in ecological, social or economic conditions. Thus, RAC performance
could better be measured in the future by focusing on environmental, social, and
economic outcomes.
Network Social Capital
Hypotheses 2 and 5 tested the direct effects of this network characteristic.
Hypothesis 2 tested whether RAC members with high levels of trust and shared values
lead to better performance outcomes. Results indicated that trust significantly
predicted both the average percent change from Title III to Title II (B = 116, (3 = . 119, p = .043) and commitment (B = .281, P = .256, p = .000), yet did not predict the
average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II (B = .132, p = .033, p = .577).
The R2for trust and Title III to II was .014 and .066 for trust and commitment. Mean
shared value did not predict any of the performance variables (B = 2.010, p = .026 p =
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.655 for avg. other; B =

195, P = -.010, p = .860 for Title III to II; and B = -.254, P =-

.012, p = .837 for commitment).
Thus, increasing levels of trust were significantly associated with positive
commitment. This finding, while not surprising, validates the importance of nurturing
trust among group members as a top priority in building commitment towards the
network’s stated goals. As with degree centrality, increasing trust levels were
significantly associated with a negative average percent change from Title III to Title
II (i.e., a greater level of trust was significantly associated with a decreasing
percentage of Title II funds). Again, this finding is contrary to the positive
relationship hypothesized between trust and the average percent change from Title III
to Title II. Here, the potential reasons for this result parallel those of degree centrality.
As will be discussed in the Mediational Analyses section of this Chapter, positive
degree centrality is significantly associated with positive trust indicating that as the
number of ties among RAC members increases, so does their level of trust. Thus, it is
possible that increasing trust levels among RAC members may have also led to
consideration of other types of needed projects, such as Community Wildfire
Protection planning using Title III funds.
Hypothesis 5 tested whether network social capital has a positive association with
network management. The results indicated that trust significantly predicted decision
capability (B = .590, P = .803, p = .000) while mean shared value did not predict
decision capability (B = -.492, P = -.032, p = .711). The R2 for trust and decision
capability was .645. However, as discussed previously, a correlation of .803 exists
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between trust and decision capability, indicating that the two variables may be tapping
the same construct. In addition, as will be discussed in the Mediational Analyses
section of this Chapter, decision capability was no longer significant when controlling
for trust.
One reason why trust is more powerful than decision capability may be the result of
RAC members’ increasing tendency toward “all gain” agreements, as encouraged by
the voting structure in the Act. As argued by Susskind and Cruikshank (1987),
reaching “all-gain” agreements necessitates the exchange of accurate information
about true priorities. Critical to this type of exchange is trust among group members
(Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). Therefore, as the trust
level among RAC members increases, they are able to share information and
knowledge more reflective of their true priorities. This, in turn, allows them to
increase their potential to reach “all gain” agreements, or decisions, in concert with the
goals of the Act.
Network Management
This network characteristic was tested in Hypothesis 3, which asserted that RAC
members with greater decision capability have more effective or desirable
performance outcomes. The results of this test suggested that decision capability
significantly predicted commitment (B = .334, P = .238, p = .006), but did not predict
either the average percent “other” funds leveraged with Title II (B = .051, p = .010, p
= .912) or the average percent change from Title III to Title II (B = -.123, P = -.086, p
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= .321). The R2 for decision capability and commitment was slightly higher than most
variables at .057 thus accounting for a slightly larger percent of the overall variance.
This test verified that in building greater decision capacity, RAC members
effectively demonstrated their ability to reach “all gain” agreements to achieve the
goals of improving relationships and allocating Title II funds to improve ecological
conditions as set out in the Act. This high level of performance in achieving these
goals has not gone unnoticed in the Congress as will be further discussed in the Policy
Implications section of this Chapter. Significantly, it is the successful performance of
RACs that stands out as a key point of agreement among Congressional
Representatives and Administration Officials as they debate and discuss re
authorization of the Act (personal notes from the Senate Sub-Committee for Energy
and Natural Resources hearing on Senate Bill, S.380, on March 1, 2007).
Mediational Analyses
Mediational analyses were used to test Hypotheses 4 and 6. Hypothesis 4 tested
whether network social capital was directly affected by network structure, and whether
it mediated the effect of network structure on performance outcomes.
In testing the direct effects of Hypothesis 4, the results indicated that the numbers
of ties among RAC members (i.e., degree centrality) and structural holes significantly
predicted trust. The impact of these results are perhaps best illustrated in the
following two network diagrams, where Figure 6 displays a RAC with low structural
holes and Figure 7 displays a RAC with a large number of structural holes.
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Figure 6. Example of RAC with Low Structural Holes
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Figure 7. Example of RAC with High Structural Holes

In Figure 6, the paucity of interconnecting lines indicates a low number of ties
between nodes. Also evident in this figure is the clustering of similar shaded points,
where black represents Group A, white represents Group B, and gray represents Group
C. Here, the person with the greatest number of structural holes is 35A3 who clearly
gains access to the greatest level of information and resources as inferred by the
number of ties to other points. Person 35C5 also has multiple structural holes
spanning other members of the same group, while illustrating limited access to
information and resources from Groups A and B.
In contrast, Figure 7 illustrates a RAC with a greater number of structural holes as
illustrated by the greater number of ties connecting nodes. Members representing each
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of the groups are central in this figure, indicating greater access to information and
resources across groups. Thus, by increasing the number of structural holes (and ties),
greater access to information and resources is gained across groups. As indicated by
the regression analyses, greater numbers of structural holes as well as increasing the
total number of ties is significantly associated with higher levels of trust. This finding
emphasizes that as trust increases so does the benefits of brokering information
between RAC members, particularly across the different interest groups.
Of the three paths tested for mediational effects in Hypothesis 4 the results
indicated that the effects of degree centrality and effective size on commitment were
mediated by trust (confidence intervals .0712 to .3252 and .0401 to .2886,
respectively). Trust partially mediated the effect of degree centrality on commitment
as the direct path c’ was still significant, whereas effective size was fully mediated by
trust as the direct path c’ was no longer significant. The effect of degree centrality on
the average percent change from Title III to Title II was not mediated by trust
(confidence interval -.2032 to .0101). When the mediational paths were tested again
incorporating the control variables gender, single or multiple counties, and group, the
results remained unchanged; however, with the addition of covariates, the R2values
increased somewhat.
Hence, trust played a critical role in mediating the effect of network structure on
the level of commitment. This finding substantiates the primary premise of this study,
that in addition to the direct effects of network characteristics on network
performance, the mediating effect of network social capital on network structure is
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significant in predicting network performance. Accordingly, it is argued that trust
mediates the effect of both structural holes and the total number of ties (i.e., degree
centrality) in predicting the level of RAC members’ commitment to achieving the
goals set forth in the Act. It has been suggested that structural holes encourages
competitive behavior among group members (Burt, 1992, 1997). Yet, it is argued here
that, because structural holes span traditionally adverse groups, the increased access to
information and resources actually results in increased levels of trust leading to greater
network performance.
Hypothesis 6 tested whether network management was determined by network
structure, and whether it mediated the effect of network structure on performance
outcomes. Thus, this hypothesis tested whether decision capability mediated the effect
of degree centrality on commitment. In addition, trust and decision capability were
tested together in a mediational path.
The results indicated that the effect of degree centrality on commitment was fully
mediated by decision capability (confidence interval .0618 to .6050). This suggests
that the effect of degree centrality on commitment occurred only through decision
capability. However, as discussed earlier, when the mediational analysis was run
with both trust and decision capability as mediators, the results indicated that, when
controlling for trust, the mediational affect of decision capability was no longer
significant. The findings for Hypothesis 5 suggest a possible reason for why the
mediational affect of decision capability is no longer significant when controlling for
trust. As stated, it may be the result of RAC members’ increasing tendency toward
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“all gain” agreements, where trust is a prerequisite for the accurate exchange of
information about true priorities.
Limitations o f Study
The social network design of this study called for the collection of data at one point
in time. Fortuitously, this study was conducted at the conclusion of the authorizing
legislation, enabling participants to share a comprehensive view of the manner in
which the studied network characteristics influenced their performance. Yet, missing
from this study was an initial view of how these same characteristics affected their
early performance, precluding the analysis of trends in performance over the life of the
legislation.
The network model tested represents a single trajectory from network
characteristics to network performance. It is likely that network performance in turn,
affects the evolution of the tested network characteristics. This cyclical phenomenon
is similar to the concept of adaptive management, where outcomes present an
opportunity for network participants to adapt their behavior to improve performance
outcomes over time. While conducting this type of research is complex, it could add
value to the literature domain.
Also, this study focused on those RACs authorized under the Secure Rural Schools
and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000. However, the use of RACs is not
unique to the Act. Both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management have
used RACs to assist in other land management issues, including the use of recreation
fees. Because these other RACs include a different mix of interests and geographical
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locations, this study may be somewhat limited in the assessment of RAC
characteristics and their influence on performance.
Perhaps most challenging in this study was the overall response rate of RAC
members (37.1%). While surveys were prepared for each RAC member, their ability
to complete and return the survey was reliant on a Forest Service RAC Coordinator to
voluntarily administer and return the completed surveys. Also problematic was the
infrequent meeting schedule of RACs. For example, some RACs only met once a
year, outside of the period of study. Because network analysis is particularly
sensitive to missing data, the breadth and depth of all RAC member relationships were
not captured.
Finally, the measured variables in this study accounted for 50% of the variance in
performance, suggesting there may be other factors affecting RAC performance that
were not included in this study. Other factors not considered included network
learning characteristics and other network management variables such as leadership
style, incentives and rewards, and program stability. Also not considered were the
relationships of RAC members with Forest Service officials. Considering the
importance of ongoing re-authorization hearings, the addition of these and other types
of variables are worth pursuing.
Limitations o f the Act in Assessing Natural Resource-based Outcomes
To ascertain whether or not forest ecosystems are enhanced, the Act requires a
detailed monitoring plan for every RAC project, to assess, “Whether or not the project
met or exceeded desired ecological conditions...” (P.L. 106-393 § 203 (b)(6)). These
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reports and their associated outcomes, were considered as a potential indicator of
network performance for this study, but ultimately were not included. The reason for
this decision centered on the lingering question of whether or not RAC projects
actually enhance forest ecosystems. Based on my 20 years of field experience as a
professional Forest Hydrologist with the U.S. Forest Service, I understand that the
small and isolated nature of most RAC projects make it difficult to monitor and detect
ecological change distinct from other on-the-ground activities within the same
watershed (Rogue Basin Restoration Technical Core Team, 2004; U.S. Forest Service,
2005). Thus, while monitoring ecological change is imperative to assessing our
impact on the land, ultimately enabling us to adapt our behavior towards more
sustainable outcomes, the requirement to assess each RAC project’s contribution
separate from other activities may not be desirable or even possible. This does not
mean that RAC projects should not be monitored for certain attributes. However, their
effect on the ecological condition should be considered along with all on-going
activities as part of a larger, ongoing monitoring effort within a watershed.
Implications fo r Future Research
This study applied social network analysis to new governance structures in the
public sector. The application of this type of analysis within the government sector
remains largely untapped, and could provide a wealth of knowledge about building
effective networks in support of the public good. In particular, the value of RACs in
effecting positive community involvement in natural resource management outcomes
should not be underestimated. Further research could consider how the increased level
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of trust among RAC members extends to the community it serves in building
community resilience and adaptive capacity. Should RACs now authorized under the
Act be re-authorized, a longitudinal study would provide valuable information on how
their dynamics continue to evolve and change over time. Also, the addition of other
network characteristics, such as network learning, or how leadership styles contribute
to network management, could broaden the scope of how network characteristics
influence performance. It would also be interesting to extend the RAC network to
include Forest Service officials, particularly Designated Federal Officials and RAC
Coordinators to assess trust levels between community interests and government
interests. Finally, as governments rely less on public employees and more on partners
to conduct the public’s work, this type of research provides a platform for other
research to increase our understanding of the key attributes needed to build long-term
public, private, and non-profit relationships.
Policy Implications
It has been suggested in recent reauthorization hearings before Congress that
Resource Advisory Committees hold promise as an effective alternative governance
structure in achieving positive natural resource management outcomes. This research
was partly developed to assist in these ongoing deliberations and will discuss several
important policy implications.
Networks and Discursive Democracy
The growing importance of network governance structures creates policy
implications when applied to democratic theory and practice. While history tells us
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that the American form of government evolved from the liberal traditions of Hobbes,
Locke, and Madison, the contributions of Rousseau and the Anti-Federalists cannot be
ignored in consideration of the resurgent demand for citizen involvement in the
governance process (Marshall & Ozawa, 2004). As discussed by Held (1996):
Rousseau saw individuals as ideally involved in the direct creation of the laws
by which their lives are regulated, and he affirmed the notion of an active and
involved citizenry: all citizens should meet together to decide what is best for
the community and enact the appropriate laws.. .In Rousseau’s account.. .a
political order offering opportunities for participation in the arrangement of
public affairs should not just be a state but a type of society (p.57).
Marshall and Ozawa (2004) suggest that the resurgence of a more participatory
approach is found in the deliberative/discursive democracy movement. Here, the
quality of participation in the democratic process is as important as who participates in
it. Extending this discursive democratic notion of participation within the
administrative setting opens the door for improving the responsiveness of government
to solving issues of ecological importance. It has been argued that, “.. .the structure of
liberal democracy itself is ultimately incapable of responding effectively to ecological
problems” (Dryzek, 2000, p. 143). Essentially, this argument recognizes that
ecological problems are marked by a high degree of complexity and uncertainty, as
well as substantial collective action problems. Thus, any adequate political
mechanism for dealing with them must accommodate the ability to change when a
natural system’s equilibrium is disturbed and to coordinate across different scales and

95

actors. Dryzek believes, “Coordination is often problematical because the currency of
interest group pluralism consists of tangible rewards to particular interests. Such
particular interests do not add up to the general ecological interest” (2000, p. 144).
Consequently, interests may be mollified in proportion to their material political
influence, and compromise achieved across them, while at the same time large-scale
ecosystem damage may yet occur.
However, given the ecological limitations associated with liberal democracy, it
remains a healthier alternative than most political mechanisms. The fact remains that
the way in which political systems are structured can influence how ecological values
associated with an individual’s sense of well-being are realized. Within the past
several decades, Americans have been challenging prevailing natural resource
management policies developed in the Progressive era. Our understanding and
perception of natural systems seems to be undergoing substantial change. Cortner and
Moote believe, “The convergence of changing social values, growing scientific
knowledge, and evolving professional and managerial experiences around concepts of
integration and ecological sustainability signals a potential revolution in natural
resource management” (1999, p.28).
Correspondingly, Dryzek suggests, “...rather than jettison democracy in the search
for an ecologically rational political economy, we might better proceed by detaching
democracy from liberal anthropocentrism, while retaining an emphasis on deliberation
and communication” (2000, p. 147). He argues, “.. .discursive democracy is better
placed than any alternative model to enter into fruitful engagement with natural
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system s. . ( 2 0 0 0 , p. 140). The contention here is that authentic deliberation involves

enlarged thinking, as intention must be cast in terms of persuading others, rather than
just stating one’s case for change.
Dryzek substantially expands the debate by suggesting, “The interests that become
internalized in the processes of enlargement need not be confined within the
boundaries of the human world” (2000, p. 140). While this may sound far-fetched, its
pragmatic expression lies in the ability of humans to perceive ourselves situated both
socially and ecologically. Therefore, humans-as-ecosystem-members would be in a
position to challenge others’ interpretations of the needs of ecosystems in which they
are component parts. Making the connection to deliberation, Goodin argues that,
“.. .discursive democracy in the public sphere.. .creates a situation in which interests
other than your own are called to mind” (1996, p. 847). Again, this refers to
promoting an aura of “enlarged thinking” as we attempt to influence one another in
matters larger than ourselves.
How then does a Resource Advisory Committee, as an alternative governance
structure, contribute to this deliberative, democratic approach? As a perfunctory
measure, RACs are essentially inserted into an existing process. The outcome of this
process legally constitutes a recommendation to the Designated Federal Official, who
holds formal decision-making authority. As acknowledged by Marshall and Ozawa
(2004), “In a strict sense, because the official decisionmaker is not obligated to decide
in a manner consistent with the recommendation, these processes offer little that is
new in terms of the democratic nature of decision making” (p. 133). Yet, they also
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suggest another view that such processes,

. .in fact challenges the hegemonic power

of institutions and dominant elites” (Marshall & Ozawa, 2004, p. 133). Critical to this
view, participants share information from non-traditional sources, thus transforming
the knowledge base for decisions. In this manner, joint understanding is created,
frequently reshaping public understanding of the problem and alternatives for its
resolution. The fact that over 4400 resource improvement projects were
recommended, approved by the Designated Federal Official, and implemented without
appeal lends strong credence to the suggestion that this type of alternative governance
process offers a positive step toward discursive, democratic governance.
Networks and Traditional Bureaucratic Models
How then does a bureaucracy, such as a federal land management agency, adapt to
this deliberative, democratic approach? Managing a government entity, such as a
National Park, that achieves most of its mission through networks of partners, requires
an approach and skill-set different from traditional government models (Brian O’Neill,
Golden Gate National Recreation Area Superintendent, personal communication
October 24, 2006). Thus, a network approach to governance appears incongruent with
the dispersed professional bureaucracy currently used by federal land management
agencies to deliver public services and to fulfill public policy goals. This traditional
model, developed during the Progressive Era of the late 1800’s and early 1900’s
created a professional, scientifically-based cadre of resource management disciplines.
Mintzberg (1993) has characterized this traditional type of bureaucracy as an,
“.. .inflexible structure, well-suited to producing standard outputs but ill-suited to

98

adapting to the production of new ones” (p. 209). Thus, a traditional bureaucratic
model of government simply does not meet the demands of our complex, rapidly
changing age.
To institute collaborative policies and procedures that better reflect today’s
demands; the government needs employees with new network skills. This will require
that government personnel systems transform the way they recruit, train, and reward
employees. Hence, job descriptions and personnel policies must allow this change to
happen. These changes, while far from being institutionalized, are not out-of-reach;
recent initiatives such as those recommended by the Interagency Cooperative
Conservation Team have established a set of core competencies at the executive-level
that are focused on the skills needed to effectively work in collaboration and
partnership (U.S. Government Accountability Office, October 2005). Perhaps the most
pervasive challenge to actively pursuing and valuing collaborative skills are the
cultural norms embedded within federal land management agencies that persistently
draw innovative practices back to traditional patterns of convergent thinking.
Networks and Accountability
A final, practical policy implication of network governance concerns questions of
accountability, such as: How does government give up some control and still ensure
results? Perhaps more fundamental is the question, what results are important?
Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) argue, “Key to unraveling the accountability
conundrum is understanding the hierarchy of responsibility. Who should be held
accountable, and by whom?” (p. 122). Traditionally, government accountability
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issues have been addressed through narrow audit and control mechanisms. Although
such tools can help, Goldsmith and Eggers (2004) argue, “An over reliance on box
checking and rule compliance - in which government contract monitors focus on
wrongdoing instead of making partnerships work - leads to an adversarial relationship
with partners” (p. 123). In creating adversarial relationships, innovation is stymied and
trust suffers, thereby reducing the value of the relationship. Over 20 years ago, Hendee
(1984) emphasized this point when he asserted that the public, “.. .is increasingly
distrustful of decision making by technical experts” and called for reestablishing a
relationship with local communities (p. 340). While formal accountability structures
provide an avenue for establishing the human element in natural resource
management, more often, it is the day-to-day informal interactions and exchanges
between government officials, business interests, landowners and community
members that build sustainable relationships. Frenz, et al. (2000) found that,
“ .. .community relationship building has the potential to benefit communities by
contributing to community economic stability, cohesion, and social equity”
(Davenport, et al., 2007, p. 44).
If we accept this premise, should we then, as local citizens in a global economy, be
accountable for this potential? If, in securing economic stability, improving cohesion
and social equity through the sustainable use of our remaining natural resources, have
we not then, achieved significant results? Further, if these results are in alignment
with the mission of federal agencies such as the U.S. Forest Service, then a focus on
community relationship building becomes critical to meeting the agency’s mission.
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Thus, the key is balancing formal accountability structures with the purpose of a
network: to provide a decentralized, flexible, creative response to our potential for
achieving sustainable social, environmental, and economic communities.
Pragmatically, the procedures set forth in Title II of the Act outlined a functional
system of accountability measures including: clear definitions of the public good to be
produced; a determination of who was accountable for what and by whom; incentives
for producing results (i.e., the allocation of funds to implement recommended and
approved projects); open and transparent public input processes; and government
control systems for tracking expenditure of funds. Lacking from this system was
transparency related to internal government service costs. Funding to coordinate RAC
activities was the responsibility of the local government unit (i.e., Ranger District or
National Forest) and not accounted for in the overall cost of implementing the statutes
set forth in the Act. This “hidden cost” often caused frustration on the part of unit
supervisors, which at times was perceived by RAC members as a lack of commitment
on the part of the agency. Thus, to improve accountability, government service costs
should be transparent and incorporated into the overall cost of implementing the
statutes set forth in the Act.
Conclusion
This re-examination of the assumed direct relationship between network
characteristics and performance, especially as it pertains to the influence of network
structure on performance, will improve future studies in the burgeoning field of social
network analysis.
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This study provided practical implications for policy makers in the use of
collaborative strategies for achieving effective natural resource management
outcomes. By gaining understanding of the social mechanisms used by individuals to
increase the level of cooperation among diverse stakeholders, our ability to create
governance structures capable of encouraging those same social mechanisms can
improve. It is clear from this study that trust is a vital component of performance,
particularly in collaborative networks. Thus, our natural resource management
agencies currently have an opportunity to improve public trust by placing more
emphasis on networked systems of governance.
Ultimately, I believe that increasing our understanding of the benefits and
challenges facing networked governance structures (such as Resource Advisory
Committees) will lead to a local community’s ability to remain resilient in the face of
outside social, economic and even environmental forces. RACs represent an excellent
foundation on which to build this process of increased adaptive capacity. More
models of collaboration, and further study of this phenomenon, will provide agencies
and communities more effective tools for addressing the complex challenges to come.

Americans o f all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form
associations ...if they never acquired the habit offorming associations in ordinary life,
civilization itself would be endangered.
-Alexis De Tocqueville
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Appendix A.
Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act o f 2000 (P.L. 106-393)
Since 1908, the Forest Service has shared 25% of the gross receipts derived from
the sale or use of national forest commodities with the counties where national forests
are located. The program was enacted to compensate local governments for the taxexempt status of federal lands. The program was called Payments to States, because
each state allocates the funds to road and school programs, usually based on the
national forest acreage in each county. The funds for the 25% payment are
permanently appropriated from the National Forest Fund, an account used to collect
receipts (Gorte, 2000).
The Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000 (P.L.
106-393) was authorized by Congress to ameliorate the impact of a precipitous decline
in the 1908 Receipt Act payments made to counties beginning in the late 1980’s. For
example, in some areas of eastern Oregon, payments to the local counties declined by
as much as 97% from over $10 million in fiscal year 1991 to $309,000 in fiscal year
1998 (Gorte, 2000). The decline had severe and continuing impacts to public
education and county road systems, particularly in rural communities.
The Act established a new collaborative model and an increased role for
community interests in federal land projects and decisions. It also provided
mechanisms for communities to invest funding for projects in or adjacent to federal
lands, and set aside funds to use for other specific community needs related to federal
land.

Ill

Implementation of the Act is ultimately the responsibility of the executive
branch, and is legislated to end in 2006. There are three express purposes of the Act
(Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000, § 2(b)):
1. To stabilize payments to counties to provide funding for schools and roads.
2. To make additional investments in, and create additional employment
opportunities through, projects that improve the maintenance of existing
infrastructure, implement stewardship objectives that enhance forest
ecosystems and restore and improve land health and water quality.
3. To improve cooperative relationships among the people that use and care for
Federal lands and the agencies that manage these lands.
Title I of the Act offers counties the option of continuing to receive payments under
the 1908 Receipt Act or to receive their share of the average of the three highest 25percent payments made to the State during the period of fiscal year 1986 through
fiscal year 1999. Those counties electing to receive their share of the high-three
payment, referred to as the full-payment amount, and receiving a payment of $100,000
or more, are also required to reserve between 1 5 - 2 0 percent of the funds to be spent
on projects defined under Titles II and III of the Act.4 Title II authorizes reinvestment
of payments for federal land projects as recommended by Resource Advisory
Committees (RACs) created under the Act, subject to approval by the agency.5 The
Act also stipulates that the Secretary concerned (i.e., Secretary of Agriculture for the

4 Ibid, § 102(d)(l)(A )(B ). Titles II and III do not apply if the total payment is less than $100,000. If the
county does not make an annual election for Titles II and/or III, the funds automatically revert to the
Treasury.
5 Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination A ct o f 2000, § 203(a)
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Forest Service and Secretary of Interior for the BLM) establishes and maintains
members of these committees.6 Title III authorizes counties to spend funds on nonfederal land but restricts expenditures to search and rescue, community service,
easement purchases, forestry education, fire prevention and planning, and community
forestry.7
Title II under P.L. 106-393. Title II projects on federal land are recommended by
RACs and must reside within the RAC boundary area (e.g., county boundary or
combinations of county boundaries).8 While 50 percent of project funds must be used
for either road maintenance/obliteration or watershed improvement/restoration the Act
does not preclude the recommendation of revenue generating projects. In addition to
following all applicable environmental studies and federal laws, project proposals
must include: purpose of project, duration, cost, proposed source(s) of funding,
expected outcomes, as well as a detailed monitoring plan.9
Resource Advisory Committees,10 All RACs must comply fully with the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), the General Services Administration (GSA)
regulations implementing FACA, and USDA departmental regulations. The four
primary duties assigned to an individual RAC include: 1) reviewing projects proposed
under Title II of the Act by participating counties and other persons; 2) proposing
projects and funding to the Secretary of Agriculture; 3) providing early and continuous

6 Ibid, § 205(a)(1)
7 Ibid, § 302(b)
8 Ibid, § 203(a)(1)
9 Ibid, § 203(b)
10 This discussion o f Resource Advisory Committees is limited to those authorized under the Secretary
o f Agriculture.
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coordination with appropriate Forest Service officials, and; 4) providing frequent
opportunities for interested parties to participate openly and meaningfully, beginning
at the early stages of project development.11
Each RAC consists of 15 members appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Committee members are required to represent the interests of the following three
categories (Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination Act of 2000, §
205(d)):
•

Five persons who-represent organized labor; represent developed outdoor
recreation, off-highway vehicle users, or commercial recreation activities;
represent energy and mineral development interests; represent the commercial
timber industry; or hold Federal grazing permits or other land use permit
within the area for which the committee is organized.

•

Five persons representing-nationally recognized environmental organizations;
regionally or locally recognized environmental organizations; dispersed
recreational activities; archaeological and historical interests; or nationally or
regionally recognized wild horse and burro interest groups.

•

Five persons who-hold State elected office or their designee; hold county or
local elected office; represent American Indian tribes within or adjacent to the
area for which the committee is organized; are school officials or teachers; or
represent the affected public-at-large.

RAC members serve three-year terms and may be reappointed to subsequent threeyear terms.12 While each RAC has a Chairperson, elected from among its members for
11 Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination A ct o f 2000, § 205(b)
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a term o f one year, the Secretary o f Agriculture is responsible for appointing a

Designated Federal Officer (DFO) for each RAC.13 Although RAC composition is
encouraged to be local, members need only reside within the State or States under
which the RAC has jurisdiction.
RACs are encouraged to meet as often as necessary to carryout their assigned
duties; some RAC meetings occur on a monthly basis while others meet only once
every six months (Chris Nota, personal communication, May 27, 2004). As required
by FACA, all RAC meetings are open to the public and announced in the local
newspaper of record one week in advance as well as in the Federal Register. The
voting structure requires that a majority of RAC members must be present to
constitute an official meeting of the committee and importantly, the approval of a
majority of the members of each of the three membership categories is required to
approve a project for recommendation to the Secretary.14

Appendix B.

12 Ibid, § 205(c)(1)
13 Secure Rural Schools and Community Self-Determination A ct o f 2000, § 205(d)(5)
14 Ibid, § 2 0 5 (e)(l)(2 )
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Al. (RAC member name)

RAC Performance Survey
PART ONE -A b out You
PIm k place a cheek (V) next to the most correct answer:

1, Have you served « this RAC far mere than one term?

yes

2, Would yon ik e to m t o m other fern?

yes

^

no
no

3. What percentage effRAC meetings (induiing subcommittees) do you attend?
90400%

,_ 8 0 -8 9 %

70*79%

60-69%

50*59%

Less than 50%

4. Approximately how far, on average, do yon travel to reach these meeting)?
0-15 miles

16-50 miles ____51400 miles
201 -300 m ite

_101-I50 miles ____ 151-200mil.es
over 300 miles

PART TWO - Network Structure
5.

Please rate the working relationship that you have with the other RAC members by
placing a *2”, *ST, or *HP* next to each name according to this scale:
2=1 exchange a p ra t deal of infonsnatkm, advice or support with this person.
1= 1 exchange same or a little taJtoimafton, advice ©r support with this person.
I exchange no information, advice or support with this person,
A2. (name-cods « t e w with RAC member name)

A3.
A4.
AS.
Bl.
B2.
.___ B3,
154.
B5.

Cl.

ei
C3,
C4.
„___ C5.
(Please aintinue on next page's
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P A ST THREE - Your Feed trade
The following; questions ask about yoar opinions regarding RAC policies, procedure*,
aad the workings o f year RAC. Please indicate your level of agreement with each statement
by circling the number on the scale that most closely matches yoar opinion.

6.

1 have » dear knowledge and tatdcretsndiiig of P,L 196-393, the “Payments to States”
legfeslsrtioa.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly A g r e e

7, “Payments to Statesw legislation {PL 106393} should be renewed after fecal year 20(16.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

4

5

6

1
Strongly Agree

T ie mandate that project approval requires %Majority in each 5-member subgroup
has been helpful to this RAC’s decfai»«»n»ktag processes.

8.

1
2
Strongly Disagree

9.

3

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly Agree

AH interest groups with a stake la a specific project have been represented in RAC
discussions prior to decisions being made regarding that project.

1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly Agree

1<1 As a result of dfccossioa or recommendations from others, my RAC readily adapts
to new r i t e and processes.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7

Strongly A g r e e

11, If there was a subcommittee, d k B i s i m and conclusions of that .subcommittee were
disclosed to the full RAC during regular m eeting, (leave blank if not applicable)

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Disagree

6

7
Strongly Agree

(Please continue on next page)
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12, W hen m aking decisions, this R AC identifies options that address the concerns o f all

membera
1
2
S ta n g ly D isagree

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly A g r e e

Tliis RAC evaluates options using specific criteria a n d / o r procedures.

13,
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
Strongly

Agree

14, Once d « h i# tts are m ade, an action plan is developed to determ ine tasks and a timeline*
1

2

3

4

S

6

Strongly D i s a g r e e

7
S tr o n g ly

A g ree

15. A process fur resolving disputes w as agreed to early, and is followed daring all proceedings.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly D i s a g r e e

7
S tr o n g ly

A g ree

16. T h is MAC addresses problem s or issues openly' and effectively,
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7

Strongly Agree

17, I f written agreements are m ade, they list who will accom plish w hat actions, and
a specific d ale for their completion,
1
2
S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

3

4

5

6

7
S tr o n g ly

A g ree

18, T h is RAC is achieving the goals set forth In P.L 106-393.
1
2
S t r o n g l y Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
S tr o n g ly

A g ree

19, 1m addition to the p a h required by P.L. 1§6-395, this MAC is achieving Its own goals.
1
2
S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

3

4

5

6

7
S tr o n g ly

A g ree

(Please continue on n e x t p a g e )

118

20. When RAC members agree to something, I know they will keep to that agreem ent
t

2

3

4

5

6

S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

7
S tr o n g ly A g r e e

2 1 . O ther R AC m em bers reciprocate n e t s a f g o o d w ill or generosity.
1

2

3

4

5

6

?
S t r o n g l y Agree

S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

22. O ther RAC members listen and sincerely try to understand other points o f view.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

23.

7
S tr o n g ly A g r e e

O t h e r RAC members p r o p o s e m h fh sis t h a t are c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e n e e d s o f
m o s t M A C members.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly A g r e e

5

6

7
S tr o n g ly A g r e e

S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

24, T h is R A C w orks hard to solve disagreem ents.
1
2
S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

3

4

I am able to freely express new idea% opinions or recommendations during all meetings.

25,
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7
S tr o n g ly A g r e e

26, I easily accept changes to R A C rales and procedures.
I

2

3

4

S

6

S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

7
S tr o n g ly A g r e e

27, In m y everyday i f * I alw ays trust people, even those I don’t know.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly D i s a g r e e

6

7
S t r o n g l y Agree

(Please eon ttw e to next page)

1

21, 1 trust RAC members of th* commodity' prodmctloii/it»tarked recreation group.

1
2
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

29, I trust RAC members o f tbe auviKromentoRnon-motoriKd recreation group.

6

I
2
Strongly Disagree

7
S tr o n g ly A g r e e

30* I trust RAC members of the state, local and tribal representative group:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly Agree

Strongly Disagree

3 1, I undersbmd w hat Is expected o f RAC members,

3
Strongly Agree

Strongly Disagree

32, I carefully follow guidelines or rules created by the RAC.

Strongly Agree

Strongly Disagree

**The final 10 questions focus on your priorities regarding tbe categories o f project objectives
in 1 ilc 11 o f PJL 186-393:

33. I believe that RAC rMemmeudatfoii* should focus on road, trail and infrastructure
mafateM&cfc
1
2
S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

3

4

5

6

7
S tr o n g ly A g re e

34. 1 believe that MAC recommendutimas s lo a ld focus on road, trail and infrastructure
o M ite ra M o B ,
1
2
S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

3

4

5

6

7
S t r o n g l y Agree

(Please continue to next page)
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35. I believe that RAC recommendations should focus on soil productivity im p r o v e m e n t .
1
2
Strongly D i s a g r e e

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

36. I believe that RAC r e e o m « a # a tiM s should focus on improvements. M ltresi«osY SM m .
health.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly Agree

37. I believe that RAC recatiiiuendlatkuis .should focus on watershed reitgaM anjBd
m aiiitctiM se.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strangty Disagree

7

Strongly Agree

38. I belkve that RAC recaaunendntkMit should foots on restoration, maintenance and
improvement of wildlife habitat.
1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7

Strongly Agree

39. I M ic v e that MAC recommendations should focus on restoration. maintenance and
improvement o f f»shih g |ite |1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Disagree

7

Strongly Agree

40. I believe that RAC recom iaiBialans should toe® on control o f aosiewt* and exotic weeds.
1

2

3

4

5

6

S tr o n g ly D is a g r e e

7
Strongly A g r e e

41. I believe that RAC recommendations should focus on re-establishment of native snccies.
1
2
Strongly Disagree

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly Agree

(Please conduoe to final page)
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42,

Please ranis m Im portance to you, from one to nine, the categories of protect objectives from
T itle II « f P.L. 106*393:
3 - Highest importance
9 = Lowest m p o r t a a c e

_

_

_

R o a d , trail and infrastructure m a i n t e a a n c e

R o a d , t r a i l a n d m 'f i r a r t r a c & i r e o f e l i t e m d o n

Im p ro v e m e n ts in fo r e s t e c o s y s te m h e a l*

Soil p r o d u c t i v i t y i m p r o v e m e n t

Watershed restoration and improvement

R e s t o r a t i o n , maintenance a n d improvement o f w i l d l i f e h a b i t a t

R e s t o r a t i o n , maintenance a n d i m p r o v e m e n t o f f i s h h a b i t a t

C o n t r o l o f noxious a n d e x o t i c w e e d s

Reestablishment of native species

Thank you very much for your assistance with this research I Please place this survey
in the envelope provided by the individual, who gave the instructions, and return the
sealed envelope to them. It will be mailed directly to me, and your confidentiality
will be protected. tZdx&'MmM'
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Appendix C.
RACs and their locations by state and county or borough

State

RAC

County or Borough

Alaska

Ketchikan Gateway
Unincorporated
Unincorporated

Arizona

Ketchikan
Prince of Wales
Upper Lynn Canal - Icy
Strait
Wrangell-Petersburg
Yakutat
Eastern Arizona Counties

Arkansas/Oklahoma

Ozark - Ouachita

California

Alpine County
Del Norte County
Fresno County
Glenn/Colusa County
Lake County
Lassen County
Madera County
Mendocino County
Modoc County
Plumas County
Shasta County
Sierra County
Siskiyou County
Tehama County
Trinity County
Tuolumne County

Unincorporated
Yakutat
Apache, Gila, Graham,
Greenlee, Navajo
Baxter, Crawford,
Franklin, Garland,
Johnson, Logan,
Madison, Montgomery,
Newton, Perry, Polk,
Pope, Saline, Scott,
Searcy, Sebastian, Stone,
Van Buren, Washington,
Yell and Le Flore,
McCurtain in Oklahoma
Alpine
Del Norte
Fresno
Glenn, Colusa
Lake
Lassen
Madera
Mendocino
Modoc
Plumas
Shasta
Sierra
Siskiyou
Tehama
Trinity
Tuolumne
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State

RAC

County or Borough

Idaho

Central Idaho
Eastern Idaho

Lemhi, Custer, Butte
Bannock, Bear Lake,
Bonneville, Caribou,
Clark, Franklin, Fremont,
Jefferson, Madison,
Oneida, Power, Teton
Boundary, Bonner,
Kootenai, Shoshone,
Benewah
Nez Perce, Clearwater,
Latah, Lewis, Idaho
Adams, Boise, Elmore,
Gem, Valley, Washington
Jefferson, Copiah, Adams,
Franklin, Lincoln,
Wilkinson, Amite,
Lawrence, Pike
Flathead

Idaho Panhandle
North Central Idaho
Southwest Idaho
Mississippi

Southwest Mississippi

Montana

Flathead County
Lincoln - Beaverhead
Mineral County
Ravalli County
Sanders County
Tri - County
Deschutes/Ochoco

Oregon

Fremont - Winema
Hood - Willamette

Northeast Oregon

Rogue - Umpqua
Siskiyou
Siuslaw

Mineral
Ravalli
Sanders
Deerlodge, Granite, Powell
Crook, Deschutes, Grant,
Jefferson, Klamath, Lake,
Wheeler
Klamath, Lake
Jefferson, Wasco, Hood
River, Multnomah,
Clackmas, Marion, Linn,
Lane, Douglas
Baker, Crook, Grant,
Hamery, Malheur,
Morrow, Umatilla, Union,
Wallowa, Wheeler
Lane, Douglas, Jackson,
Josephine, Klamath
Coos, Curry, Josephine
Benton, Coos, Douglas,
Lane, Lincoln, Polk,
Tillamook, Yamhill
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State

RAC

County or Borough

South Dakota
Texas

Custer County
Davy Crockett

Custer
Houston, Trinity

Washington

Columbia County
Colville

Columbia
Ferry, Pend Oreille,
Stevens
Grays Harbor
Lewis, Skamania
Skagit, Whatcom

Grays Harbor
North Gifford Pinchot
North Mt. Baker Snoqualmie
Olympic Peninsula
Snohomish County
South Mt. Baker Snoqualmie
Southeast Washington
Forests
Wenatchee - Okanogan
Wyoming

Crook County

Clallam, Jefferson,
Mason, Thurston
Snohomish
King, Pierce
Asotin, Garfield
Chelan, Kittitas,
Okanogan, Yakima
Crook
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Appendix D.

Portland State Univetsity HSRRC Memorandum
To:

Debra Whitall

From : William Helsiey, Chair, HSRRC 2006

Date: June 23,2006
Re:

Approval o f your application entitled, “Network Analysis o f a Shared-Governance
System” (HSRRC Proposal

# 06192)

In accordance with your request, the Human Subjects Research Review Committee has reviewed
your proposal referenced above for compliance with DHHS policies and regulations covering tbe
protection o f human subjects. The committee is satisfied that your provisions for protecting the
rights anti welfare o f all subjects participating in the research are adequate, and your project is
approved. Please note the following requirements:
Changes to Protocol: Any changes in the proposed study, whether to procedures, survey
instruments, consent forms or cover letters, must be outlined and submitted to the Chair o f the
HSRRC immediately. The proposed changes cannot be implemented before they have been
reviewed and approved by the Committee.
C ontinuing Review: This approval will expire on June 23. 2007. It is the investigator’s
responsibility to ensure that a Continuing Review Report (available in ORSP) o f the status o f the
project is submitted to the HSRRC two months before the expiration date, and that approval of
the study is kept current.
Adverse Reactions: If any adverse reactions occur as a result o f this study, you are required to
notify the Chair o f the HSRRC immediately. If the problem is serious, approval may be
withdrawn pending an investigation by the Committee.
Com pletion of Study: Please notify the Chair o f the Human Subjects Research Review
Committee (campus mail code ORSP) as soon as your research has been completed. Study
records, including protocols and signed consent fonns for each participant, must be kept by the
investigator in a secure location for three years following completion o f the study.
If you have questions or concerns, please contact the HSRRC in the Office o f Research and
Sponsored Projects (ORSP), (503) 725-4288, 111 Cramer Hall.

cc:

Craig Shinn

appa-fvai memo

126

